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  • 经济学聚焦:公允价值计量的会计原理

    2007-09-07

    [2007.08.30][Economics focus]A book-keeping error

    Economics focus
    经济学聚焦


    A book-keeping error

    记账错误

    Aug 30th 2007
    From The Economist print edition



    The accounting principle that is meant to capture fair value might end up distorting it
    采用公允价值计量的会计原理其结果可能是歪曲它。






    AS THE old joke goes, there are three types of accountant: those who can count and those who cannot. What and how they count is often contentious. A long-fermenting issue is how far “fair-value” accounting, which uses up-to-the-minute market information to price assets, should be pushed in banking. The bodies that set accountancy standards believe the more accurate disclosures are, the better. Regulators meanwhile have fretted that market-based accounting would increase fluctuations in banks' earnings and capital, which might increase risks to financial stability. And commercial banks are reluctant to expose the idiosyncrasies of their loan books to the glare of market scrutiny.
    以前的笑话曾经说到，世上有三种会计，一种是能数数的，一种是不能数数的。数多少和怎么数则是一直有争议的。一个长期争议的话题就是在银行业应当在何种程 度上采用以实时市场信息为资产定价的公允价值会计。会计准则制定者认为披露的信息越精确越好。但同时对市价基础会计加大银行盈利和资本波动所增加金融稳定 性的风险也有所焦虑。而且商业银行也不愿将它们贷款账簿的特质暴露在市场的注视之下。

    The attractions of fair-value accounts are straightforward. By basing values on recent prices (“marking to market”), they paint a truer picture of a firm's financial health than historical-cost measures. These gauge net worth from the arbitrary dates when assets and liabilities were first booked. In principle, fair-value accounting makes a firm's viability plainer and enables shareholders and regulators to spot financial trouble more quickly. Proponents say that market-based accounting would have limited the fallout from America's savings-and-loan crisis and stopped the rot from Japan's non-performing loans much earlier.
    公允价值会计的吸引力是显而易见的。与历史成本计量相比，通过以近期价格确定价值（市值价格），可以获得一个企业财务健康程度更加真实的情况。在资产和负 债被首次记账后，公允价值会计可以精确测量其净值。理论上来说，公允价值会计可以使一个企业的生存能力更加清晰，并且使股东和监管者更快地发现财务问题。 支持者认为市价基础会计会减少美国80年代存贷机构危机带来的负面影响，并且更早地阻止日本呆坏账滋生的腐败。

    An arbitrary past versus a distorted present
    武断的过去VS 扭曲的现在

    New research suggests that the increasing reach of fair-value accounting might be a mixed blessing. A paper* by Guillaume Plantin of the London Business School, Haresh Sapra of the University of Chicago and Hyun Song Shin of Princeton University concludes that fair-value accounting could sometimes generate fluctuations in asset values that distort the very price information that it puts such store by.
    最新研究表明公允价值会计的使用范围的扩大可能是一件好坏掺半之事。伦敦商学院的Guillaume Plantin，芝加哥大学的Haresh Sapra以及普林斯顿大学的Hyun Song Shin合著的论文中认为公允价值会计有时引起的资产价值的波动会扭曲它所一直储存的真实价格信息。

    The paper examines the incentives of a bank faced with a choice between selling a loan or keeping it on the balance sheet. Because the bank knows its borrower better than anyone else, it has the best idea of what the loan is really worth. Its managers are rewarded according to the accounting profit of the bank.
    论文分析了银行在面对出售或持有贷款抉择时的动机。因为银行更了解其借款人，它自己对贷款到底有什么价值拥有最好的认识。它的经理们因为银行的会计利润而受到奖赏。

    If loans are valued at historical cost and market values are rising, the loans are likely to be sold if this is the only way of realising profit, even if the market undervalues them. The banks' managers take a profit and get paid accordingly, although shareholders would be better off if the loans were kept. Fair-value accounting gets around this agency problem. Loans do not have to be sold to cash in on their rising value: marking the assets to their market value has the same beneficial effect on profits and on managers' pay.
    如果贷款以历史成本计量并且市价上升，那么尽管市场可能低估其价值，但是在卖出是唯一实现利润的方式的情况下，贷款仍很可能被卖掉。虽然持有贷款对股东最 有利，但是银行的经理们仍会卖出贷款获取利润并相应得到报酬。公允价值会计能够规避这种代理问题。贷款不会在价值上升时被卖出套现，将资产标记为市场价值 可以对利润和经理们的报酬产生同样有利的作用。

    However, in the wrong circumstances fair-value accounting could also induce wasteful sales—of long-term, illiquid loans. Left on the books and marked to market, a loan will be valued at the price at which others have managed to sell. But when there are only a few potential buyers, that may be especially low. So managers will be tempted to sell in the hope of a better price. Because all banks with similar assets face the same incentives, they will all sell, driving the price down. Their shareholders would have been better off had the loans been kept until they fell due. The temptation to sell is greater for longer-term loans.
    但是，在错误的情况下公允价值可能引起不经济的卖出长期非流动贷款。在账簿和市场中，一项贷款的价值是其卖家愿意卖出的价格。但是当只有少数潜在买家的时 候，价格会非常低。所以经理们会希望能买一个更高的价格。因为所有拥有相同资产的银行都有同样的动机，所以都卖出导致价格下降。其实持有贷款至到期日对银 行的股东们是最有利的。对于长期资产来说，卖出的吸引力更大。

    In this way, a fair-value regime can itself distort the very prices that are supposed to reflect the true worth of assets. The prospect of lower prices can encourage selling which drives down prices further. The information derived from market prices becomes corrupted, and the result is a growing divergence between reported net worth and true value.
    这样，公允价值自身会歪曲反映资产实际价值的真实价格。而对更低价格的预期会促进继续卖出使价格进一步降低。从市场价格中得来的信息变得有缺陷，结果是报告的净值与实际价值偏离的越来越大。

    This theoretical model is a challenge to the ideal of fair-value accounting: that more information is always better. Although it is technically feasible to mark to market even idiosyncratic assets such as loans to small businesses, it might not be desirable. The authors point to a well-established principle in economics, that incremental moves towards perfect competition are not always good. Eliminating one market imperfection (such as poor information) need not bring the ideal of a frictionless economy closer, because this may magnify the effect of remaining distortions (such as managerial short-termism or illiquid markets).
    这种理论模型是对公允价值会计观念的挑战：信息越多越好。尽管在技术上盯市是可行的，哪怕是像中小企业的贷款这种特质资产，但是这可能不值得的。作者们指 出了一个经济学中行之有效的理论，向完全竞争的接近不总是好的。排除一个市场的不完全因素（比如信息不完全）不需要更加接近无摩擦经济，因为这样会扩大继 续失真的作用（比如管理的短期或非流动市场）

    The paper also underlines some lessons about market liquidity that have been painfully learned outside of academia in the recent market troubles. There is a fair chance that asset markets will stay liquid (in the sense that willing sellers are matched with willing buyers), as long as the actions of market participants are essentially random. But anything that co-ordinates the actions of sellers—in this case, the disclosure required by fair-value accounting—can easily lead to sharp movements in asset prices.
    论文中也强调了一些市场流动性的教训，这些都是学术界之外的最近发生的市场问题导致的惨痛教训。只要市场中的参与者的行为确实是随机的，那么资产市场会一 直具有流动性（自愿买家与自愿卖家相匹配）。但是同卖家行为相对等的任何事（在这里指公允价值会计对信息披露的要求）能轻易地导致资产价格大幅变动。

    Is the model of self-defeating co-ordinated selling very realistic? Recently, for example, Bear Stearns, a Wall Street investment bank, held off from selling assets into an illiquid market because the transaction prices would have set a nasty benchmark for its other portfolios. So illiquidity prevented asset sales rather than induced them. Mr Shin replies that in instances like this, where there happens to be a dominant holder of assets, there is less chance of sales into a falling market.
    非利己调整卖出模型是现实的么？比如，最近一家华尔街的投资银行Bear Stearns因为交易价格会为其其他投资组合作出坏的榜样而拖延卖出非流动市场中的资产。因此非流动会阻止资产的卖出而不是引导。Shin先生认为在资 产有占支配地位持有者的情况下，在市场低迷时卖出资产机会更少。

    Although more accurate disclosure of balance sheets is desirable, the work of Mr Shin and his colleagues is a reminder that there are always trade-offs to any policy change. These authors put their argument in stark terms: “The choice between these measurement regimes boils down to a dilemma between ignoring price signals, or relying on their degraded versions.” In their advocacy of fair-value accounting, accountants are rightly pursuing the interests of investors. But policymakers have to worry about wider issues. Accountancy may be too important to be left solely to accountants. Even the ones that can count.
    尽管更精确地披露资产负债表是可取的，但是Shin先生和他同事们的研究提醒我们任何政策的变更都会有利有弊。论文的作者们用不加掩饰的语言来表达了他们 的观点：“对于那些会计计量体制的选择其实归结起来就是不理会价格信号或者依赖过时信息之间的两难抉择。”在他们对公允价值会计的倡导中，会计人员是会公 正地维护投资者的利益。但是政策制定者却不得不担忧更广泛的问题。会计学已经重要到不能只依靠会计人员的程度，尽管会计会算账。

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