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  • 基地组织：到底谁捉谁？

    2007-08-21

    [2007.08.16] Who is hunting whom?到底谁捉谁？

    Afghanistan and Pakistan

    Who is hunting whom?
    到底谁捉谁？

    Aug 16th 2007
    From The Economist print edition

    Al-Qaeda's border-straddling safe haven, and what to do about it
    关于基地组织的跨境藏身地以及解决这个问题的办法



    EVERYONE can see that George Bush's “war on terrorism” is coming to grief in Iraq. Now things are going awry in Afghanistan, too. The United States drove out the Taliban regime in order to deprive al-Qaeda of a safe haven. Nearly six years on, this aim has not been realised.
    我们都知道布什在伊拉克的“反恐战争”正不断陷入泥潭。现在阿富汗的局势也好不到哪里去。六年前美国为了不让基地组织有藏身之处而推翻了塔利班政权，但直到现在仍未能如愿。

    In large tracts of southern Afghanistan the writ of the elected government of Hamid Karzai does not run and Taliban fighters operate more freely than the NATO forces that prop him up. Worse, this hostile territory crosses the border into Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), home to some 3m people, where the writ of Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, hardly runs either. And now the general may be losing his grip on Pakistan as a whole. Far from being caught in a pincer between pro-American governments in Kabul and Islamabad, al-Qaeda and its fellow travellers have consolidated a stronghold that encroaches on the territory and may in time threaten the survival of both.
    卡尔扎伊领导的民选政府在阿富汗南部的大片地区政令不通，在那儿塔利班武装分子远比北约部队行动自如。更糟糕的是这个混乱的地区还跨过边境一直延伸到拥有 3百万人口的巴基斯坦联邦管辖部落地区（FATA）。巴基斯坦总统穆沙拉夫将军对控制那片地区也力不从心。何况现在看来，穆沙拉夫在整个巴基斯坦的政权都 摇摇欲坠。基地组织和它的外国雇佣兵不仅没有被亲美的阿富汗和巴基斯坦政府军团团包围，反而已经牢固地控制住自己的地盘并不断蚕食两国领土，如果不加遏制 势必最终威胁到两国政府的安全。

    It is important to stress that neither government is in immediate peril. The NATO force in Afghanistan is harrying the Taliban in the south and can certainly protect Kabul. The prospect of Pakistan, a country of 160m people, falling to Islamist extremists is still just a nightmare. But if America and its allies fail to take remedial action now, or if they take the wrong action, the danger of exacerbating the enmity of millions of Muslims in both countries is acute.
    当然我们也必须承认这两国政府也并非已经四面楚歌。北约驻阿富汗的部队不断扫荡南方的塔利班部队，保卫喀布尔并无大碍。同样如果有人说拥有1.6亿人口的 巴基斯坦会最终跌入塔利班的魔爪，那也只是杞人忧天罢了。但如果美国及其盟友不马上采取有效的行动来遏制现在这种不利的形势，抑或是他们采取了错误的行 动，很有可能会使这两国上百万穆斯林对西方产生更强烈的敌视情绪。

    Afghanistan's needs are clear: more troops for a NATO effort that has always been under-resourced and so depends on airstrikes that often kill civilians and make more enemies; more effort by the government to reach out to the remote Pushtun tribes who shelter the Taliban; less corruption; a consensual approach to poppy eradication that does not drive farmers over to the Taliban by threatening their livelihoods.
    阿富汗政府现在需要什么是显而易见的：派遣更多军队来协助北约部队执行当前的任务，因为北约部队现在已经兵员不足而不得不更多依赖空袭，但空袭非常容易伤 及无辜而树立新敌；政府加大力度与偏远地区为塔利班提供保护的普什图族部落进行沟通；政府内部减少腐败现象；以不威胁到农民生计的方式消灭罂粟种植业，因 为只有这种能让各方接受的方式才不会让农民走投无路而投靠塔利班。

    Although Pakistan is more complicated, one certainty is that the idea proposed recently by Barack Obama—sending in American troops against al-Qaeda—would be high folly. Pakistan is not just any Muslim country: it was founded at India's independence as a Muslim homeland. Its people are quick to anger when they feel Islam is under attack. Above all, most of Pakistan is not currently in the jihadists' camp.
    虽然巴基斯坦的问题要比阿富汗更复杂，但一点可以肯定的是最近奥巴马提出的派美国军队到巴基斯坦与基地组织作战的想法是非常荒谬的。巴基斯坦不仅是一个穆 斯林国家，在独立时它就被设计为一个印度穆斯林的家园。因此当那里的人民觉得自己的伊斯兰信仰受到威胁时，他们比别的穆斯林更容易被激怒。当然，大多数巴 基斯坦人目前仍然没有加入圣战者的行列。

    That is not to deny there is support for the Taliban (who were Pakistan's allies until General Musharraf's pro-American about-turn after September 11th); and parties with an ideology close to the Taliban's have won power in some areas. But they are a minority. In the 2002 elections the Islamists won only 11% of the popular vote. That would swiftly change if America blasted its way into Pakistan's sovereign territory.
    这并不是否认在巴基斯坦内部仍然有人在支持塔利班（在911事件发生巴基斯坦转投美国前塔利班还是巴基斯坦的盟友），一些与塔利班有类似信仰的政党也在一 些地区选举中获得了胜利。但他们毕竟只占少数。在2002年的选举中伊斯兰分子只赢得了11％的选票。不过如果美国强行闯入巴基斯坦的领土，这种情况会马 上发生变化的。

    If Candidate Obama has got it wrong, the policy President Bush has pursued also needs new thinking. For the past six years General Musharraf has put on a brilliant show of being America's indispensable ally, holding out against the Islamist tide that would otherwise sweep Pakistan and its nuclear weapons into al-Qaeda's grateful arms. An anxious America accordingly pumps in aid, to the tune of about $1 billion a year. Last month's storming of Islamabad's Red Mosque, which Islamists had turned into an extremist bastion in the heart of the capital, fitted seamlessly into the general's script.
    如果说下一任总统候选人奥巴马的想法是不正确的，那现任总统布什所实施的政策也是值得商榷的。在过去六年里，穆沙拉夫将军努力阻挡伊斯兰潮流席卷巴基斯 坦，以使其核武器不至于旁落至基地组织手中。他以此非常完美地将自己展现成美国不可或缺的盟友。美国因为急需他帮助也理所当然地向其提供了高达每年10亿 美元的巨额援助。当位于首都伊斯兰堡市中心的红清真寺已经成为伊斯兰极端分子的大本营，政府上月对红清真寺的突袭就不难理解了。

    This is not all a show. General Musharraf has indeed arrested many al-Qaeda types and handed some over to America. He sent the army into the tribal areas in an unsuccessful attempt to impose control. Behind the scenes, however, the story has been murkier than the one on stage. General Musharraf has been careful not to alienate the Islamists entirely, and has at times acted as their sponsor. The army and intelligence services try to root out the sort of jihadists who have tried three times to assassinate the general, but by most accounts continue to hedge their bets against an American failure in Afghanistan by maintaining links to the Taliban.
    当然这也不完全是在向美国作秀。穆沙拉夫将军的确抓了许多基地组织分子并将他们转交给美国。他曾派遣军队到部落地区，不过未能取得对那些地区的控制权。但 在幕后，事实却没有那么简单。穆沙拉夫一直小心行事以防疏远所有穆斯林分子，有时甚至成为他们的幕后支持者。军队和情报机构一直想揪出三次试图刺杀穆沙拉 夫的圣战分子，但许多专家认为政府仍然保留着与塔利班的联系以防万一美国最终在阿富汗遭受失败。

    Until recently America turned a blind eye: better the general you know than the deep green sea of jihadism. But to see General Musharraf as lone defender against the Islamic tide is to misread Pakistan. It is not the Islamists but the moderate mainstream that has lost faith in him. His sacking of the chief justice (since reinstated) and his desire to have himself re-elected by the existing legislatures before the next general election have disgusted voters. America should not give uncritical support to a military ruler who is blocking the return of the democracy that Pakistan appears now both to want and to need. Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, was right last week to talk him out of declaring a state of emergency.
    直到最近美国仍然对此睁一眼闭一眼，因为美国政府毕竟清楚知道圣战分子并不是一朝一夕可以清除的。但是如果把穆沙拉夫将军看作是抵挡伊斯兰浪潮的唯一依靠 那就大错特错了。现在反对他的不是伊斯兰分子，而是温和的主流大众。他解除了首席大法官的职务（现在已经恢复原职了），并希望议会在下次大选前让他连任， 这都使他在选民中不得人心。美国不应该向一个阻止巴基斯坦回归民主的军人独裁者提供无条件的支持，何况当前巴基斯坦人民希望、也急需回归民主。因此国务卿 赖斯上周劝说穆沙拉夫不要宣布国家进入紧急状态是正确的。

    The president has worn a uniform too long
    总统先生领导军队太久了

    Democracy will not cure all Pakistan's ills: the democratic decade from the late 1980s was ruinous. Nor would an elected government necessarily find it any easier to tame the tribal areas. But with authority deserting the general, Pakistan is hungry for a way forward. A democratic government would have to cohabit with the army and maybe also with a (downsized) President Musharraf. It may not do much more to help the West in Afghanistan. But it might start to tackle the grievances that have helped spread al-Qaeda's poison at home.
    但是民主也无法治愈巴基斯坦当前所有的顽疾：80年代后期开始的十年民主时期是伤痕累累的。地方部族也不会买民选政府的帐。但是如果穆沙拉夫无法继续执政 下去，巴基斯坦各界必将开始努力寻求解决问题的方法。新成立的民主政府需要学会如何与军方，或许和（权力减少的）穆沙拉夫总统一同执政。这或许对西方在阿 富汗的军事行动没有很大的帮助，但也许可以阻止基地组织这颗毒瘤在巴基斯坦的进一步扩散。

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