《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版

The same factors played a part in other rich countries, such as America. Yet the EU economies, and especially the euro area, have in recent years performed much less well than the American economy, which is comparable in size. GDP per head in the euro area is almost 30% lower than in America, and the gap is widening: the OECD reckons that trend growth per person is only about 1.5% a year, compared with America's 2%. Productivity growth in Europe slowed in the late 1990s, whereas in America it speeded up. Unemployment in Europe has been persistently higher than across the Atlantic. Europeans have also been slower to take up information technology, and the economic climate has been less conducive to innovation and research and development (R&D).

同样的因素在其他富国也有影响，比如美国。然而，欧盟经济体，尤其是欧元区，近年的表现远输于美国，只在总量上差不多。欧元区的人均GDP几乎低美国30％，而且差距仍在扩大。经合组织（OECD）估计每人每年的经济增长趋势仅为1.5％，相形之下，美国为2％。1990年，欧洲生产力发展有所减慢，但美国却在加速。与大洋彼案相较欧洲失业率始终很高。欧洲的信息技术起步较慢，经济形式又不利于创新和研发。

The transatlantic gap can be exaggerated: much of America's faster GDP growth merely reflects faster population growth and longer hours of work, and differences in measurement also play a role. But the perception that over the past decade Europe has stopped catching up with America, and in some respects actually fallen behind, is broadly accurate.

也许两国间的差距被夸大了：大部分美国的高速GDP增长仅仅反映较快的人口增长和长时间工作，还有就是不同的计算方式。但这一理解却是确实准确的，那就是在过去的10多年，欧洲停下了追赶的步伐，事实上在某些方面已落后美国。

Europe's response has come in two main forms: the creation of the euro in 1999 and the drawing up of the so-called Lisbon Agenda④ in 2000 to boost the EU's competitiveness. The Lisbon Agenda set an ambitious goal for Europe: to turn it into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010. The plan was to promote liberalising reforms, increase R&D spending and encourage the deregulation of labour and product markets across the continent. Similarly, the euro's proponents hoped that the single currency would not only increase cross-border trade but also, by imposing tougher price and wage discipline on its members, speed up structural reforms in all European economies.

欧洲通过两种方式予以回应。1999年创造欧元，2000年起草里斯本议程④（Lisbon Agenda）以推动欧洲竞争力。里斯本议程为欧洲定下了远大目标：到2010年，将欧盟建成“全球最具活力的知识经济体”该计划提倡自由化，增加研发投入，鼓励在整个欧洲解除劳动力和产品市场管制。同样，欧元倡导者还希望单一的货币不仅能增加双边贸易，而且通过对会员国强制执行严格的价格和工资纪律，来加快整个欧洲经济体的结构改革。

Yet even the most fervent EU enthusiast would concede that these hopes have come to little. Joaquín Almunia, the economics commissioner, maintains that the current revival is linked to the structural reforms made in recent years, which may be starting to pay off. But most economists put it down to two other factors: a cyclical upswing and a huge improvement in German competitiveness after years of real wage restraint. If they are right, it is reasonable to doubt that today's recovery will prove sustainable—and to fear that Europe's economies could slip back into their previous underperformance.

然而即使最狂热的欧盟迷们都得承认，这种愿望很难实现。Joaquín Almunia是经济专员，他认为当前的经济复苏与近几年的结构改革有关，而这些改革也许已初见成效。但大多数经济学家把原因归结为其他两点：多年的实际工资增长限制后，出现了周期性高涨和德国竞争力的巨大飞跃。如果他们是对的，那么就有理由质疑“今天的复苏被证明是可持续的”这一言论。并且担心欧洲经济将倒退回之前的不景气。

Look on your doorstep

一庐不扫，何以扫天下。

So what is Europe's problem? First, whatever it is, it is not Europe-wide, nor indeed linked to the euro. This supposedly sclerotic continent includes three of the world's five best-performing and most competitive economies: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Britain and Ireland have also done well in recent years. Nor is it only north European economies that have put in a spurt: Spain, too, has grown fast since 1999. Of these six success stories, three are in the euro zone and three are not.

那么欧洲出了什么问题？无论是何原因，首先不是整个欧洲本身，也和欧元无确实联系。这大概是这个僵硬的大陆拥有全球表现最好，最具竞争力的五大经济体中的三个——丹麦，芬兰，瑞典。英国和爱尔兰近些年表现也很好。并非只有北欧经济已开始“井喷”。西班牙自1999年，也开始快速增长。以上六个成功案例中，三个在欧元区，三个不在。

The poor performers in Europe have been the core countries of the euro, in particular France, Germany and Italy (see chart 2). Since these three account for two-thirds of euro-area GDP, their failings have led to slow growth for both the euro area and the EU as a whole. It is evident that Europe's economies have sickened at national not European level, so it is at national level that the cures are needed.

欧洲表现拙劣的都是些欧元区的核心国家，尤其是法国，德国，意大利。因为这三个国家占欧元区GDP的三分之二，他们的失败就会拖慢欧元区和整个欧洲的增长。显然，欧洲经济体的病灶来自国家机器而不是欧洲，所以在国家层面上，治疗是必须的。

Nor is there much disagreement among economists about what those cures should be. In all three countries labour and product markets are too highly regulated, holding back employment growth and making their economies less flexible. Both the IMF and the OECD have been urging further liberalisation as the only sure route to better economic performance. Even Europe's political leaders understand this, though they are also swift to spot political obstacles to reform. As Luxembourg's Mr Juncker once said, “we all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we've done it.”

并非经济学家们对如何“治疗”意见不合。而是在上述三国中，劳动力和产品市场管制太严。这抑制了就业率的增长，而且使经济不够弹性。国际货币基金组织（IMF）和经合组织（OECD）都呼吁进一步自由化是经济好转的不二法门。甚至欧洲的政治领导人都深谙此道，尽管他们也能敏锐的察觉有碍改革的政治障碍。卢森堡的Juncker先生曾说过：“我们都知道该怎么作，只是不知道这样作了之后怎样赢得选举。

Mr Almunia hopes that the recent improvement in the EU economies may break the unfortunate cycle of partial reforms that take time to bear fruit and are often followed by election defeats. But there is another, less hopeful possibility: that opponents of change will treat the present recovery as a sign that no further reforms are needed.

Almunia先生希望近来的欧洲经济起色可以打破部分改革的“魔咒”，那就是慢条斯理的进行改革，常常随着之而来的是选举失败。还有一种可能，但不抱什么希望，那就是对手起了变化，认为当下的复苏意味不必进行下一步改革。

Within the euro area a debate is in progress over whether the single currency itself encourages or discourages reforms. Most of its progenitors had hoped for the first. The euro has clearly boosted intra-EU trade, by somewhere between 5% and 15%, according to the OECD. It has also been a spectacular success from a technical point of view, establishing itself not just as a viable currency but as the only plausible rival to the dollar. For example, it now accounts for 25% of global foreign-currency reserves. Yet the euro's broader economic impact has been limited because of its members' failure to liberalise enough. As the OECD puts it in its most recent report on the region, “insufficient flexibility prevents the euro area reaping the full benefits of economic and monetary union.”

欧元区内部正在讨论单一货币本身是有利于改革，还是不利于改革。大多数欧元创造者一直期待前者出现。据OECD报告，欧元已经明显促进欧洲各国间的贸易，有些地方增加5％到15％。从技术上看，同样激动人心。欧元的创造并不是仅作为一种流通币，而是成为看似可靠的美元对手。比如，现在欧元占据全球外汇储备的25％。但是欧洲广泛的经济影响还是有限的，因为不少成员国还不够“自由”。同样OECD在最近的关于该地区的一份报告中提到：“缺乏灵活性使得欧元区无法从经济和货币同盟中充分获利。

When the euro began, critical economists directed most of their fire at the stability and growth pact⑤, which attempted to set rigid limits on budget deficits run by euro members and threatened huge fines if those limits were breached. This provision made little economic sense. Because the single currency deprived members of monetary and exchange-rate flexibility, they were likely to need more, not less, fiscal flexibility. Predictably enough the stability pact was swiftly bust by France and Germany, after which it was fitted with extra loopholes.

当欧元出现时，经济评论员把多数矛头直指《稳定与增长公约》⑤，该公约对欧元区成员国掌控的预算赤字予以严格限制。如果超出限制将受到巨额罚款。这个规定毫无经济意义。因为单一货币夺走了成员国的本国货币和汇率弹性空间。而他们需要的是提高弹性空间，而不是减少。完全可以预测，《稳定与增长公约》将很快被法国和德国打破，而后再被安上更多的漏洞。