《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版

[2007.03.22]Executive pay A penny for your thoughts

Executive pay
经理人报酬

A penny for your thoughts
你在想什么

Mar 22nd 2007
From The Economist print edition


If owners had a say over managers' pay, American capitalism would benefit
如果所有者对管理者的工资有点意见的话，美国的资本主义将会受益


David Simonds
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IN AMERICA you can usually count on people to stand up for their rights. Oddly, though, the shareholders in American companies are like the disenfranchised citizens of a rotten borough.
在美国，你经常可以看到人们为了维护自身权利挺身而出。然而奇怪的是，美国公司的众股东却像是有名无实选区里被剥夺了投票权的居民。

Investors in capitalism's heartland have remarkably little sway over managers in the companies they own. Rather than chivvying them to perform better, investors shrug their shoulders, sell up and move on. Disputes between managers and owners are settled not so much by consultation as by litigation.
在这资本主义的心脏地带，投资者对其所有公司管理者的控制力是出奇的小。相对于督促他们更好的表现来说，更常见的是投资者耸耸肩膀，将其全部卖出，然后继续向前。管理者与所有者之间的纠纷通过磋商解决的时候还没有通过诉讼解决的多。

This week Congress got to work on a bill that would greatly extend shareholder democracy by giving investors a vote over executive pay. That is the area in which shareholders and managers clash most often. Horrified executives maintain that if this power is granted, special interests will use it to advance their pet causes. But the bosses should welcome this reform as being in their own interests. There is much bad feeling in America between managers and shareholders; and the best way to dispel it would be to invite investors in, not to bar the door to them.
本周国会通过一项法案，赋予投资者对经理人报酬的投票权，此举将大大扩展股东的民主。这是股东与管理者最常发生冲突的地方。惊恐的经理人坚持说，如果这种 权利被准许，特殊利益者将会更易使用他们所爱诉讼。不过老板们为了自身的利益应该欢迎这场改革。在美国，管理者和股东之间有很多恶感；消除它的最好办法是 邀请投资者参与进来，而不是把他们关在门外。

Wage war, make peace
工资战争，缔结和约
Managers' pay has grown at an extraordinary pace since the mid-1980s. Not everyone in the corner office matches Bob Nardelli, Home Depot's former chief, who trousered a few hundred million dollars for six years' work that was about as impressive as one of the store's kitchen units. Still, the typical manager has prospered—and continues to do very nicely indeed (see article).
自80年代中期以来，经理人报酬以超常的速度增长着。并不是办公室里的每一个人都像家得宝（Home Depot）的前任主管Bob Nardelli一样，凭借六年的工作而收获大把财富，这就像那商店里的某套厨具一样令人印象深刻。一般的管理者依然都发达了——而且一直都很滋润。

But the widespread notion that this is the result of corporate misgovernance is wrong. For one thing, pay has risen even as governance has strengthened. American executives are far more tightly controlled, both by government and by shareholders, than they were in the 1960s and 1970s, when bosses' pay was relatively modest. Why did powerful executives back then fail to take advantage of something their weaker successors have so eagerly exploited?
不过人们普遍接受的观念——认为这是管理不当造成的后果——是错误的。首先，即使在管理加强的时候报酬也在涨。60-70年代老板报酬相对温和，美国经理 人现在受到的来自政府和股东的约束远不及那时。为什么当年强大的经理人没能成功利用得东西，他们较弱的后辈却能如此热烈的利用？

There are simpler explanations for the executives' bonanza. The shareholder-value movement started to reward managers for profits. Shareholders have duly benefited from an era of extremely high returns. Ever larger companies can afford to bid ever more to get the manager they want, because he will leverage even more assets. Chief executives earn a lot, to be sure, but not as much as top lawyers, investment bankers, traders and hedge-fund managers, who have seen their earnings grow faster still. And the successful managers of private-equity-owned companies do better than the bosses of publicly owned companies.
这里有对经理人的鸿运更为简单的解释。股东价值运动开始为利润而奖赏管理者。股东从极高回报的时代中收获了合适的利益。从未有过的大公司可以支付从未有过 的高价来获得他们想要的管理者，因为管理者将会通过杠杆借到更多的资产。诚然主管收入颇丰，但也不如顶尖的律师、投资银行家、交易者、对冲基金管理者那样 多，这些人的收入增速依然在加快。私募股权所有公司的成功管理者要比公共所有司的老板表现更为出色。

The bill before the House of Representatives' committee on financial services gives shareholders an advisory vote on managers' pay, as well as a vote if executives gain a golden parachute while their company is being sold.But if misgovernance is not the cause of the general rise in executive pay, strengthening corporate governance is surely not the solution.
众议院的金融服务委员审议中的法案将会赋予股东关于管理者报酬的顾问式投票，以及如果经理人在公司被出售时候获得黄金降落伞的投票。不过如果说，管理不善并不是经理人报酬普遍上涨的原因，那么加强企业管理肯定不是解决办法了。

It is, because the problem is not the general rise in pay but individual cases of abuse. Even if average pay is reasonable, some American bosses get outrageous salaries. That is because pay is complex and boards sometimes make mistakes. A shareholder vote might help avert them—by, for instance, curbing the excessive award of stock options in the bull market (less than 10% of which, incidentally, went to the top executives). It would also ensure that, when mistakes were made, shareholders would not be able to blame the clowns on the board, for they would be implicated too. That helps explain why some companies have already decided to give shareholders the vote.
当然如此。因为问题并不是工资的普遍上涨，而是个别事例的滥用。即使平均报酬是合理水平，但是有些美国老板拿到了令人无法接受的高新。这是因为报酬是个复 杂的问题，董事会偶尔也会犯错误。股东投票或许有助于消除它们——比如说抑制牛市中过量的股票期权奖励（顺便提及，其中10%都给予了高管）。这同样也能 保证，当错误发生时，股东无法归咎于舞台上的小丑（管理者），因为他们自己也将被牵连在内。这有助于解释，为什么现在有一些公司已经决定给予股东投票权。

What about those special interests? Public-sector pension funds do sometimes see executive pay as a political rather than a managerial issue. But the best way to ward them off is to get institutional shareholders involved.
至于那些特别利益呢？公共养老基金的确有时把经理人报酬看作一个政治问题而不是管理问题。但是避免这些问题的最好办法还是让法人股东参与进来。

British companies have been required to hold an advisory vote on pay since 2002, and this has helped defuse the hostility between shareholders and managers. Votes against managers are rare because institutional shareholders talk to firms about pay long before any confrontation threatens. American managers should try a bit of democracy too. It is, they will find, marvellous stuff.
自2002起，英国的公司被要求设有关于报酬的顾问式投票，这对平息股东与管理者之间的敌对起到作用。反对管理者的投票很少，因为法人股东在冲突发生前早已跟公司谈过了。美国的管理者也应该尝试一些民主。他们一定会发现，这真是一个绝妙的东西。(yuyafox)

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