《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版

Seabed mining
海底矿产

The unplumbed riches of the deep
来自深海的宝藏

May 14th 2009 | WOODS HOLE, MASSACHUSETTS
From The Economist print edition

And why they’ll wait a while longer before being disturbed
开采这些宝藏，还需等多久

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IN TEENSPEAK, if a star such as Madonna or J.Lo is huge, that is a reference not to her size but to her popularity. Similarly, in the world of seabed geology, if a sulphide deposit is massive, it is not necessarily big, but formless and rich in metals. As it happens, seafloor massive sulphides are also huge—at least they were until recently. The collapse in commodity prices last year has diminished them a bit, but many expect their popularity to recover.

按照青少年的话语，如果像麦当娜和詹妮弗.洛佩兹这些明星是巨星，并不是因为她的体格,而是因为她的知名度。同样，海底地质认为，如果硫化物矿床是巨大 的，并不需要其体积大，只需其不定型和其金属含量高。碰巧的是，至少目前海底块状硫化物也是巨大的。虽然由于去年的物品价格暴跌已经使其减弱了很多，但大 多数人估计其会反弹。

The excitement arose because oceanographers had started to find these mineral-rich deposits on the network of submerged mountain ranges that run along the seabed between continents (see map). Such ridges occur where the great plates of the Earth’s crust are spreading apart, and the seafloor holds formations of hot, volcanic rock.

令人喜悦的是，在大陆之间横卧在海底的山系里，海洋学家开始找到一些富含这些矿物的矿床（见地图）。这些山脉出现在地壳大板块离散的部位，此处的海底形成了热的火山岩石建造。

Ever since the dredges of HMS Challenger on her voyage of scientific discovery in the 1870s brought up from the depths “immense numbers of more or less circular nodules”, it has been known that lots of minerals lie on the seabed. However, most of these plum-sized objects—known as manganese nodules, though they contain several other metals—are several kilometres deep. Russia mines some in territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland and several other countries hold exploration licences, but bringing them to the surface has never become economic.

自从19世纪七十年代英国皇家海军的“挑战者”号科学考察船将深海大量大致成圆形的结核带出水面之后，人们知道有大量的矿产在海底。其中，李子般大小被称 之锰结核的矿石大多数在几公里深处。俄罗斯矿业在芬兰海湾的领海内和其他几个国家都持有勘探证，但将这些矿物开采到地面上经济上还不具可行性。

In the 1960s, however, mineral deposits of a different kind were found in the Red Sea, where the spreading seafloor impels the slow separation of Africa and Arabia. A similar stretching takes place wherever two tectonic plates move apart, for example, in the Galápagos Rift off Ecuador, and it was here in 1977 that the first deep-sea hydrothermal vents were discovered. These vents form above cracks in volcanic areas of the ocean floor through which seawater seeps, there to be heated by hot, sometimes molten rock. The water dissolves minerals deep in the Earth’s crust before rising like a geyser from the seafloor at temperatures of up to 400°C.

然而，在20世纪60年代，在红海发现了一种不同类型的矿床。扩张的红海海底推动着非洲大陆与阿拉伯半岛缓慢地分离。其实，在两构造板块离散的部位都存在 相似的海底扩张，例如厄瓜多尔附近的加拉帕戈斯裂谷。在此裂谷中发现了第一个深海热液通道。这些热液通道，位于海底火山区裂隙上部，由于海水渗透下去，然 后被灼热或熔融的岩石加热。这些被加热的海水溶解深部地壳的矿物，最终上升至海底形成间歇泉，其温度高达400°C。

This mineral-laden fluid, if it is rich in iron and sulphur, emerges to create a plume of black “smoke”, from which, when it meets cold bottom water, the minerals are precipitated. Tall chimneys form, growing up to six metres (20 feet) a year, and around them live strange creatures: giant tubeworms, for instance, with neither mouth nor stomach nor anus, that live on microbes whose energy derives not from the sun but from chemical compounds in the fluids from the crust. Over time the chimneys collapse, creating the deposits of high-grade massive sulphides that so excite the deep-sea miners.

当含矿流体升至海底时遇到底部冷水，矿物发生沉淀。如果这些含矿流体富含铁和硫，则会冒出一缕缕黑“烟”。此时，高大的形成，其每年生长达6米（20英 尺）。在烟囱周围生活着奇怪的生物。以巨管虫为例，它既没有嘴也没有肠胃与肛门。它赖以为生的微生物的能量不是来之太阳，而是来之地壳流体中的化学化合 物。随着时间推移，烟囱坍塌，形成高品位块状硫化物矿床。这些矿床让深海矿业很感兴趣。

Hydrothermal vents of this kind are found roughly every 100km (54 nautical miles) along the 65,000km or so of mid-ocean ridge. They are also found in volcanic “back-arc” basins behind ocean trenches, where one tectonic plate is sliding beneath another. Many of these basins are in the western Pacific, part of a great “ring of fire” that runs in a horseshoe from New Zealand north through Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan, eastward through the Aleutian islands and then south along the Pacific coast of North and South America, encompassing most of the world’s active and dormant volcanoes.

沿着大约65000公里的洋中脊，大约每隔100公里（54海里）都会有此类热液通道。在海沟后侧的弧后盆地的火山中，此处是一个板块俯冲到另一板块的地 方，也发现了该类通道，。很多这些盆地是在西太平洋：从新西兰向北到印度尼西亚、菲律宾和日本，然后向东到阿留申群岛，再向南沿着南、北美洲的太平洋沿 岸。这一马蹄形火山链包括了世界上大多数活火山和休眠火山。

High-grade stuff, just sitting there
高品位矿石，静静等候在那儿

One reason massive-sulphide formations beguile miners is that the metals they contain—notably copper, gold, zinc and silver—are highly concentrated. Another is that they are often big, 200 metres wide and long, tens of metres thick, and may contain several million tonnes of ore. All lie on the surface of the seabed, and many are only 1-2km below water level.

块状硫化物岩层让矿业公司很感兴趣，原因之一就是，它们所含的金属品位高，如铜、金、锌和银等贵金属。另一个原因是，它们经常很大，长与宽达200多米，厚10米，可能蕴藏几百万吨铁。并且，所有的矿石在海底表面，许多在水面以下仅1到2千米。

At that depth technology developed for the offshore oil industry can nowadays be employed for mining. In particular, the deep-water pumps and suction pipes developed to bring subsea oil up to the surface can be used in the riser pipes needed to bring minerals (mixed with water) up from a massive-sulphide mine. The oil industry has also developed remotely-operated vehicles to make trenches for seabed pipelines, which can be adapted for cutting ore, even though it may lie much deeper, at, say, 1.5km down. In general the technology in the machines needed to carry out deep-water mining is no longer exotic. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution has a vehicle that can reach depths of 11km.

现在，海洋石油工业的深海技术可以用于矿业。尤其是将石油从水下开采到地面所使用的石油深水泵和吸管可以用于矿业的升管中。此技术可以开采块状硫化物矿床 中的矿物和水混合物。并且，石油工业已经开发出可用于海底管道挖槽的遥控船，可以经过改造用来切割矿石，即使这些矿石在1.5千米以下也没问题。一般而 言，用于开采深水矿的技术不再遥远。伍兹霍尔海洋研究所开发的设备可以到达水下11千米。

Apart from the Russians, the only company mining the seabed at present is De Beers, which gathers diamonds off the coasts of Namibia and South Africa. These gem-quality stones were once carried down the Orange river and have since been swept up the coast, some even borne ashore by tide and wind. But they lie only about 100 metres down, so scooping them up is fairly simple.

除了俄罗斯之外，只有德比尔斯公司在海底采矿，它是在纳米比亚和南非海岸开采钻石。这些含宝石的岩石曾经顺着奥伦治河搬运到海岸，甚至有一些被海浪和风将其带上岸上。并且，大部分宝石仅在水下100米，因此寻找它们是相当简单的。

Two other companies have shown serious interest in seabed mining. One is Neptune Minerals, an Australian-based company that applied for a mining licence in 2008 for two deposits in about 1,250 metres of water near the Kermadec islands off New Zealand. It has also been granted exploration licences in territorial waters off Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia and Vanuatu. But it is nowhere near mining commercially. The other company is Nautilus Minerals, a Canadian firm whose Solwara 1 project in Papua New Guinea’s territorial waters contains 60,000-100,000 tonnes of copper, and gold too. It was due to start production next year, but most operations are now on hold.

另外两家公司对海底矿产显出浓厚的兴趣。在2008年，澳大利亚矿业公司，在离新西兰不远的克马德克群岛群岛附近水下1250米的地方，申请了两处采矿 证。在巴布亚新几内亚领海附近的密克罗西亚联邦和瓦努阿图，Neptune已经取得探矿证。但在经济上没有一处值得开采。另一家是加拿大Nautilus 矿业公司，它在巴布亚新几内亚领海的索瓦拉一号工程蕴藏6万到10万吨铜和一些金。预期明年开始投产，但现在大多数运作近乎停滞。

Corbis
考比斯图片公司

Smoke without fire—just copper, zinc, gold and silver, and creatures unimaginable
无火之烟——只有铜、锌、金和银，与难以想象的生物

The big mining companies have been watching these two ventures with interest. Anglo American, one of the biggest, has an 11% holding in Nautilus (and 45% in De Beers), chiefly, it says, to keep abreast of the possibilities of seabed mining. But Chris Carlon of Anglo is emphatic that the world’s mining industry is not yet eager to tackle the deep ocean. For a start, there is a glut of copper, the metal that probably has to cover the cost of any massive-sulphide mine, leaving gold or some other more valuable metal to provide the profit. Last year the industry produced 360,000 tonnes of copper that turned out to be unwanted. Second, plenty of land-based deposits still remain to be exploited. Anglo American alone produces on land as much copper as the likely output of 100 massive-sulphide mines. As for gold, a tonne of old mobile phones contains about three times as much of it as a tonne of typical ore, even though recovery may be problematic.

矿业巨头们非常感兴趣地关注着这两家企业。英美矿业公司拥有Nautilus公司的11%股份，以及德比尔斯的45%，那就意味着其可以跟进海底矿业。但英美矿业公司的克里斯.卡隆非常强势地认为，世界矿业公司并未急迫地区开发深海。首先，巨量的铜就已收回任何块状硫化物矿的开发成本，剩下的金以及其他更贵的金属便可以产生利润。去年，海底矿业产出了36万吨铜，结果却无法销售。其次，大量陆地上的矿床仍然需要开采。英美公司仅仅在陆地上生产的铜可能相当于100个块状硫化物矿。至于金，一吨废旧手机含金数量是一吨普通金矿矿石的3倍，即使回收可能有问题。

Moreover, mining companies much prefer the known difficulties of operating on land to those of operating on the seabed. The risks of working in a place where volcanic activity seems to have stopped but may suddenly resume are uncertain. So indeed are the possible obligations to repair the underwater environment: no legal codes are yet in place for deep-sea mining. That helps to explain why the only places in which companies have dipped more than a toe in the water are in exclusive economic zones, which are not just shallower than many parts of the distant ocean but also within the legal ambit of a national authority.

此外，矿业公司更宁愿开发陆地上困难已知的矿，也不愿意开采海底矿产。因为存在很多不确定因素。工作的危险在于，此处的火山活动表面上已经停止，但可能会 突然重新开始。虽然还没有关于深海矿业的法律法规，但更有可能需要承担修复水下环境的义务。这有助于理解为什么矿业公司只在经济专属区开展活动，那儿不仅 比许多远洋地区深度较浅，更由于其在一个国家主权的法律范围内。

Seafloor mining beyond countries’ territorial waters is regulated by the International Seabed Authority, set up under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. So far it has issued only eight licences, all for exploration, not production, all for nodules, not massive-sulphide deposits, and all to governmental or quasi-governmental agencies (of China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and an east European consortium). No wonder. Commercial miners want both a clear title to their holding and exclusive rights to exploit it. They also have to answer to shareholders.

国际海底管理局监管那些不在领海之内的海底矿产。它是在联合国大会海洋法下设立的一个国际机构。但迄今为止，它仅仅签发了8个证，且全部是勘探证，而没有 开采证；且全部是结核类的，而没有块状硫化矿；且全部是给政府或准政府的机构（中国、法国、德国、印度、日本、俄罗斯、南韩和一家东欧财团的）。不必奇 怪，因为商业矿业需要明确的持有权以及专属的开采权。同时，他们还必须向股东解释清楚。

One day, however, deep-sea mining will surely start to look commercially attractive again. At present China and Russia are the two countries most interested in massive sulphides, followed by India and South Korea. Russia, which has been grubbing around on the seabed for years, knows exactly what it wants and where: it has found four massive-sulphide deposits of over 10m tonnes each in the past four years, all on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. China is less sure of what it is after, but has become interested in the southern Indian Ocean, as well as the zone in the North Pacific where most of the manganese-nodule licences have been granted. While China makes up its mind, it is blocking all decision-making at the International Seabed Authority, which was due to issue legal, environmental and revenue-sharing regulations about mining in international waters this month but is unlikely to do so. Fortunately, no miners are in a hurry to get started—and massive sulphides, unlike huge rock stars, can wait.

尽管如此，深海矿业在将来某一天肯定会开始变得在商业上很有吸引力的。目前，中国和俄罗斯对块状硫化物矿产最感兴趣的两个国家，随后的是印度和南韩。俄罗 斯已经在海底搜寻很多年，明确知晓想要什么以及在那儿。在中大西洋脊，俄罗斯已发现四处块状硫化物矿床，并且每处都超过1千万吨。中国还不确定在寻找什 么，但已对南印度洋感兴趣，还有北太平洋。大多数锰结核矿探矿证是在北太平洋。虽然中国已下定决心，但却阻扰国际海底管理局做决策。国际海底管理局预定本 月将颁布关于国际水域矿产法律、环境和利益分配方面的规章制度，但现在可能性不大了。值得庆幸的是，没有任何矿业公司急匆匆地开始行动，且不像巨星那样， 他们能够等待。

Land deals in Africa and Asia
亚非土地交易

Cornering foreign fields
在国外囤地
May 21st 2009
From The Economist print edition

The Chinese and Arabs are buying poor countries’ farms on a colossal scale. Be wary of the results
中国和阿拉伯人大规模购买贫穷国家的农田，当心后果

Illustration by Claudio Munoz

OVER the past two years, as much as 20m hectares of farmland—an area as big as France’s sprawling farmland and worth $20 billion-30 billion—has been quietly handed over to capital-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and China. They buy or lease millions of acres, grow staple crops or biofuels on it, and ship them home. The countries doing the selling are some of the world’s poorest and least stable ones: Sudan, Ethiopia, Congo, Pakistan. Usually, when foreigners show up in these places, it is with aid, pity and lectures (or, in one instance, arrest warrants for war crimes). It must make a nice change to find their farms, so often sources of failure and famine, objects of commercial interest instead.

过去两年，沙特阿拉伯、科威特和中国这些资本输出国静悄悄的接手了大约2000万公顷的农田，面积和法国广阔的农田一般大，价值在200至300亿美元。 他们购买或租借上万英亩用来种植主要作物和生产生物燃料，并把这些运送回国。出售农田的国家是世界上最贫穷动荡的国家：苏丹、埃塞俄比亚、刚果和巴基斯 坦。外国人来到这些国家时，通常带着援助、同情和演讲（还有一种，对战争犯罪下的逮捕令）。对于这些经常资源枯竭和闹饥荒的国家来说，他们的农田能带来商 业利益，这的确是个很好的转变。

Yet while governments celebrate these investments, the rest of the world might reasonably ask why, if the deals are so good, one of the biggest of them helped cause the overthrow of the government that signed it—the one in Madagascar. Will this new scramble for Africa and Asia really reduce malnutrition, as its supporters say? Or are critics right that these are “land grabs”, “neocolonialist” rip-offs, different from 19th-century colonialism only because they involve different land-grabbers and enrich different local elites?

然而当政府颂扬这些投资时，其他国家也许会提出合理的疑问：若交易千好万好，为什么马达加斯加岛上的一个国家，最大的穷国之一，推翻了其签订农田交易的政 府？如支持者所言，对亚非新一轮的开发真的能平衡失调？抑或批评家是正确的，这些是“土地掠夺”和“新殖民主义”，与19世纪殖民主义的差别仅仅在于这些 不同的掠夺者，使得当地主导者更富裕？

Protectionism or efficiency? 保护主义还是效率？

It would be graceless to write off in advance foreign investment in some of the most miserable places on earth. The potential benefits of new seeds, drip-feed irrigation and farm credit are vast. Most other things seem to have failed African agriculture—domestic investment, foreign aid, international loans—so it is worth trying something new. Bear in mind, too, that worldwide economic efficiency will rise if (as is happening) Saudi Arabia abandons mind-bogglingly expensive wheat farms in the desert and buys up land in east Africa.

在世界上有些最贫乏的国家在注入外国投资之前就销账是不道德的。引进新种子、滴灌技术和农场信贷潜在着巨大收益，似乎其它大多数方法，如本国投资、外国援 助和国际贷款，对非洲农业不起作用，所以有必要另辟蹊径。同时要记住，若沙特阿拉伯出其不意抛售沙漠地区昂贵的小麦农田而买下东非的土地，世界经济效益是 会增长的。

Yet these advantages cannot quell a nagging unease. For a start, most deals are shrouded in mystery—rarely a good sign, especially in countries riddled with corruption. One politician in Cambodia complains that a contract to lease thousands of acres of rice contains fewer details than you would find in a house-rental agreement. Secrecy makes it impossible to know whether farms are really getting more efficient or whether the deals are done mainly to line politicians’ pockets.

然而这些有利因素不能平息烦扰不安的声音。首先，大多数交易都是暗箱操作，极少有正当签订，尤其是在腐败大行其道的国家。柬埔寨的政治家抱怨出租上万亩稻田的合同条文还没有所能找到房屋租赁协议上的多。暗地交易不可能知道农田是否被真正高效使用，或主要让政客中饱私囊。

Next, most of these deals are government-to-government. This raises awkward questions. Foreign investment helps countries not only by applying new technology but also by reorganising the way people work and by keeping an eye on costs. Few governments do this well, corrupt ones least of all. One of the biggest problems of large-scale commercial farming in poor countries is that well-connected farmers find it more profitable to seek special favours than to farm. These deals may exacerbate that problem. Worse, the impetus for many of them has not been profit-seeking by those who want to turn around failing farms. Rather, it has been alarm at rising food prices and export bans. Protectionism, not efficiency, has been the driving force. It would be better to liberalise food markets and boost trade than encourage further land grabs.

其次，大多数是政府间的交易，这增加了难题。国外投资的帮助不仅是应用新科技，而且也改变人们的工作方式并管理花费。少数政府做的不错，那些腐败政府就不 敢恭维了。穷国大规模商业农场的最大问题之一是有门道的农民找特殊关系比经营农田赚的要多，这些交易则助长了这种风气。更糟的是，在那些想周转破产农场的 人的推动下，很多都没有盈利。一定程度上，这敲响了粮价上涨和禁令出口的警钟。驱动力不是效率而是保护主义。实现粮食市场自由化和刺激贸易比鼓励进一步地 攫取土地更为有益。

Third, there are serious doubts about whether countries acquiring land are paying the true cost of it. Host governments usually claim the farmland they offer is vacant, state-owned property. That is often untrue. It may well support smallholders who have farmed it for generations. They have no title, only customary rights. Deals that push them off their land or override customary rights cannot be justified. International bodies, such as the African Union, are drawing up codes of conduct to limit such abuses. They are sorely needed.

第三，需要重视的问题是那些得到土地的国家是否支付了真实价钱。政府经常宣称他们出售的农田是未被占用的国有财产，那一般是假话，这些土地也许供养了祖祖 辈辈在此耕种的佃农，他们没有所有权，只有传统权益。交易迫使他们失去土地，并置不被公正对待的传统权益于不顾。像非洲联盟此类国际机构正拟定规定整治不 正之风，规定是急需的。

Even then, land deals will never help the poor as much as freer trade and stronger property rights. But if the deals eventually raised yields, spread technology and created jobs, that would at least be some cause for celebration. At the moment too many seem designed to benefit local elites more than local farmers; they use foreign labour and export most of their production, harming local food markets. Until they show otherwise, a dose of scepticism should be mixed with the premature hopes that the land deals have engendered.

尽管如此，土地交易永远不及自由贸易和强有力的财产权对穷国所做出的贡献大。但如果交易最终能增加收益、传授科技并创造就业岗位，至少庆祝也有了些理由。 不过目前，不少人似乎计划着让当地主导者而不是农民获利，他们雇佣国外劳动力并出口大部分产品，这打击了当地粮食市场。除非他们采用别的方法，否则,已造 成土地交易现状的如意算盘将会和一起质疑纠缠不清。

Prabhakaran
南亚枭雄：普拉巴卡兰
May 21st 2009
From The Economist print edition

Velupillai Prabhakaran, commander of the Tamil Tigers, died on May 18th, aged 54
韦卢皮莱·普拉巴卡兰，泰米尔猛虎解放组织首领，死于五月十八日，卒年五十四岁





THE body of the young man lay on a scarlet bier. He was in his colonel’s uniform and beret, with white gloves that made his hands seem enormous beside his emaciated body. His face was set in a rictus of death that was somewhat like a smile. But the portly, mustachioed man who stood looking at him, in a short-sleeved white shirt and blue trousers, hands clasped awkwardly in front of him, was not smiling.

这具年轻男尸就躺在猩红色的棺椁里面。他穿着陆军上校的制服，戴着贝雷帽，与憔悴消瘦的躯体相比，双手因为有了白手套的掩护，似乎显得过于肥大。他的面容 带着亡故后的张嘴结舌，有点像在微笑。立在边上的那个男人长着大卷曲八字胡，身体已然发福，罩着短袖白T恤，下面是件蓝裤子，双手僵硬地扣在身前，他打量 着尸首，却无半点笑容。

Velupillai Prabhakaran always said this was the moment, four years into the war in September 1987, when he gave up any faith in non-violence. The young man before him, Thileepan, had fasted to death to highlight the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority and their demands for independence. The Sinhalese majority had paid no attention. So Prabhakaran pledged himself and his Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to a path of unremitting carnage.

韦卢皮莱·普拉巴卡兰总是说，这样的时刻就是他放弃任何非暴力信仰的时刻。1987年9月，战争的硝烟还未散去，都四年了。横尸普氏面前的男子名叫 Thileepan，为引起外界对斯里兰卡少数民族泰米尔人孤苦无援的关注，表明他们要求独立自治的决心，此人绝食而死。占国内人口多数的僧伽罗人却无动 于衷。因而普氏发誓，他以及他的泰米尔伊拉姆猛虎解放组织（LTTE，下称“猛虎”）日后定将大开杀戒，踏上漫漫血洗路。

The world had to notice when, in 1996, a truckload of explosives was driven through the gates of the Central Bank in Colombo, killing 90 and injuring more than 1,000. And it had to wake up to Tamil demands when, in 1991 (though Prabhakaran always ducked away from blame for it), India’s former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was blown up by a female bomber who had bent to touch his feet. By the time Prabhakaran was felled by a bullet in his last redoubt, his war had claimed the lives of more than 100,000 Sri Lankans.

1996年，一辆满载炸药的卡车途经科伦坡的中央银行大门时发生爆炸，九十人毙命，千余人受伤。“猛虎”终于引发了国际关注。1991年，印度前总理拉吉 夫·甘地在接受一名女子弯腰触脚的礼遇时被其袭击炸死（尽管普氏总是拒绝为此负责）。国际社会终于意识到泰米尔人的权利要求。等到普氏在他最后的藏身之所 被一颗神奇的子弹击中时，他的这场战争早已掳去十万斯里兰卡人的身家性命。

And in fact his commitment to violence had been there from the beginning. On his first operation, bunking off school at 17 with his mates, he threw a bomb into a group of soldiers. His first “political” act, in 1975, was to shoot the mayor of Jaffna at point-blank range for betraying the Tamil cause, as he believed. After the founding of the LTTE, in 1976, leaders of rival groups and Tamils too moderate to agree with him were sought out and killed; he signed their death warrants. In person he was stocky, soft-spoken and with a pleasant smile, like a middle-order restaurant manager. But his wife, who first caught his eye by throwing a bucket of coloured water over him at the holi festival, burst into terrified tears when she had done it. And the girls he “cared for” at his special school in Vanni, his embryonic Tamil homeland in the north-east of the island, were trained to strap explosive belts underneath their dresses, a branch of warfare he had more or less invented.

事实上，普氏皈依暴力的路线图要从头算起。十七岁时，他便策划了生命中的第一次军事行动。在与伙伴逃学的途中，他朝一群兵丁扔了颗炸弹。他的“政治”处女 作完成于1975年，当时普氏近距离射杀了贾夫纳市的市长，因其背叛他所信仰的泰米尔人（解放）事业。1976年创建“猛虎”后，敌对阵营及泰米尔族的若 干领导人因太过温和未能与普氏达成一致便被逐一击杀。他签发了斩首令。普氏其人，体格敦实，言语温软，笑容可掬，看上去像是一家中等规模饭店的经理。但他 的妻子———“胡里节”（holi）期间她冲普氏投掷了一桶染了颜色的水之后两人便一见钟情———一旦杀人后便会泪眼婆娑，神色惶急。普氏酝酿的泰米尔人 之乡Vanni坐落在岛屿东北方，建有训练专校。那些受他“呵护”的女孩在这里学会了身藏炸弹的技巧。也可说这样的刺杀别动队或多或少乃是他的发明。

He was a shy, coddled child, the son of a land officer. His parents, both pious Hindus, were followers of Mahatma Gandhi and his doctrine of ahimsa, or non-violence. But the books young Prabhakaran read, out on the veranda under the banana tree, were biographies of Alexander the Great and Napoleon. He treasured the Bhagavad Gita not for its spiritual riches but for the passage where Krishna told Arjuna that it was his duty to fight and kill even his relations. His great hero, “a beacon to me”, was not Gandhi but Subhas Chandra Bose, who had tried to drive the British out of India with armed force.

这名深受溺爱的国土管理官员之子儿时曾颇为腼腆。双亲可谓虔诚的印度教教徒，亦是圣雄甘地（Mahatma Gandhi）及其非暴力教义（ahimsa）的追随者。但在香蕉树下的走廊上，年轻的普拉巴卡兰所读之书却是亚历山大大帝与拿破仑的传记。他之所以珍爱 《薄伽梵歌》（Bhagavad Gita）并非为了这印度史诗的精神财富，而是单恋奎师那（Krishna）向阿朱那（Arjuna）表明心志的那个章节———奎师那说，抵抗甚至弑亲， 他都责无旁贷。普氏心中的大英雄———“我的灯塔”———也并非甘地而是试图将英帝国武力驱逐出印度的苏巴斯·钱德拉·鲍斯（Subhas Chandra Bose）。

In night classes at the Aladi School he reinforced his outrage that Tamils were passed over for civil-service jobs and university places, and were sometimes beaten up in the streets. He practised martial arts, saved money for a revolver, and in 1972 slipped away into the jungle, where he lived for much of the rest of his life.

在Aladi学校温习夜校课程期间，普氏的愤恨渐趋高涨。他想到泰米尔人无缘就任文职亦无法去高校谋得生计，偶尔还会被人按在街头暴打，不平之气便像火上 浇油一般。他恶补兵法，为买一只左轮手枪而省吃俭用。1972年，他悄然溜进那块丛林，将自己余生中的大半光阴浑然洒在那儿了。

Curry and Clint Eastwood
咖喱与克林特·伊斯特伍德

As a leader of terrorists he built up an impressive reputation. He waged war for 26 years. At one time, as much as a third of Sri Lanka was under his control. Prabhakaran divided his thousands of Tiger recruits into an army, a navy (with some light boats) and an air force (with flimsy aircraft), and raised money for weapons by extortion, robbery and arm-twisting of the Tamil diaspora. He refused to compromise the cause or make encumbering alliances. When India began to sponsor Tamil groups, he kept clear of them, and when Indian peacekeepers came to Sri Lanka in the 1980s he ended by fighting them.

作为一名恐怖分子头领，普氏树立了赫赫威名。他打了二十六年的战争。曾几何时，斯里兰卡几乎三分之一的土地在他掌控之下。他化整为零，将数千“猛虎”新兵 分成海（装配若干轻型舰艇）陆空（带有劣质飞机）三只作战部队，通过绑票、劫掠以及利用海外族人的影响来筹措军费。他拒绝任何可能危及其“光复大业”的妥 协，或是那种妨碍性的结盟。当印度开始资助泰米尔反政府武装时，他奉行的是不接触策略；当印度的维和部队在八十年代进驻斯里兰卡时，他便朝对方猛烈开火，再无回旋余地。

No philosophy or ideology guided him, as far as anyone could tell. He did not like abstractions. Nor could he tolerate debate. Despite a peace agreement in 2002 a separate Tamil homeland, with its enemies eliminated, was all he would accept. In Vanni he more or less constructed one, neat and organised as he always was, with thatched huts and coconut groves along dirt roads. There was no power, but the place had its own banks and law courts. The Sinhalese army fenced it in with barbed wire and bombed it. Among the craters were the remains of lush gardens, and lagoons filled with lilies, that might have made the sort of Tamil paradise Prabhakaran carried in his head.

毋庸置疑，普氏的指南针上没有哲学或意识形态的位置。他憎恶抽象的概念，论辩也为他所不喜。尽管2002年，他所能接受的一切是在被分割的泰米尔人之乡与 被剿灭的敌人达成媾和。在Vanni，普氏搭建起一个基地，鳞次栉比的小茅屋，沿着泥泞小道铺开的是一片茂密的椰树林。乡村布局井然有序，一如素来整洁光 鲜的他那样。此地没有电力供应，但有它自己的银行和法院。僧伽罗人的军队用带刺铁丝网将其围个水泄不通，尔后再大举轰炸。那些弹坑里面埋着昔日繁茂花园的 遗骸，淡水湖上则撒满了百合花，那光景兴许倒成了掠过普氏心头的泰米尔人的美好天堂。

Both the Sri Lankan and Indian governments had arrest warrants out for him. He stayed mostly underground where, like some large grub, he was oiled twice a day by his bodyguards and fed on curry and Clint Eastwood movies, in which cops and cowboys shot themselves out of trouble. He had an escape plan, or several. His cadres would kill him, and burn the body; he would squeeze himself into a submarine; he would bite on the cyanide capsule that hung on a black string round his neck.

身为印斯两国政府的要犯，普氏周围可谓是天罗地网。大部分时间他都蜗居在地下，像条巨大的幼虫。在保镖的陪同下，他每天会有两次户外放风活动。他吃的是咖喱饭菜，看的是克林特·伊斯特伍德主演的电影———剧中的警察和牛仔交火时动辄便一顿乱射。他的潜逃计划也许不止一条。手下的骨干或许会杀死他，然后再焚尸；他可能会将自己拧干，然后像枚干瘪的鱼雷那样挤入某艘潜水艇；他还可能冲着栓在脖子上的黑细绳里面的氢化物胶囊咬上一口哩。

His people, confined in the end to a beach in north-eastern Sri Lanka and shelled by the Sinhalese army, could not get away so easily from the mayhem Prabhakaran had drawn them into.

他的子民被僧伽罗人的炮火围困在斯里兰卡东北角的海滩上。这些人，绝难轻易摆脱普拉巴卡兰为他们刻画的炮灰命运。

South Korean politics

Death of a leader
领袖之逝
May 23rd 2009 | BONGHA VILLAGE AND SEOUL
From Economist.com

A former president of South Korea, Roh Moo-hyun, jumps off a cliff and kills himself
韩国前总统卢武铉跳崖自杀



THE home of the former South Korean president, Roh Moo-hyun, in the tiny village of Bongha, is surrounded by picturesque wooded hills. In the spring fire swept across the hills, blackening them. At the same time, in April, Mr Roh’s reputation was being tarnished as he admitted to graft. Since then Mr Roh, whose elder brother is in prison after being convicted of bribery, had been expecting prosecutors to bring charges. But rather than face more public humiliation Mr Roh committed suicide on Saturday May 23rd by jumping off a cliff.

韩国前总统卢武铉家位于Bongha的一个小村庄，群山环绕，山上树木茂盛，风景如画。春天，一场大火蔓延，山上一片灰烬。也就在那是，四月，卢武铉承认渎职，一世英名毁于一旦。那是，他的弟弟已被判受贿蹲大狱，而他也在面临着检察官的起诉。但卢武铉并没有选择面对越来越多的公众的指责，而是在5月23日跳崖自尽。

In a note the 62 year old said that he “made the life of too many people difficult”. He requested that his family burn his body and erect a simple grave stone to mark his life. “Isn’t life and death one?” asked the former president. Responding to the news, the justice ministry announced that it would stop the investigation into Mr Roh and his family.

在遗言，这位62岁的老人说“他给许多人带来了麻烦”。他要求家里把他火葬，只立一块简单的墓碑。这位前总统在信中问道，“生和死还有什么区别？”。司法部对此作出反应，宣布将停止调查卢武铉及其家庭。

Corruption scandals have haunted every South Korean president. The children of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam went to jail for graft. Two former presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, went to prison after it was found they had solicited hundreds of millions of dollars from the country’s biggest business groups.

贪污丑闻困扰着每位韩国总统。金大中总统和金泳三总统（韩国庆尚南道人,第14任韩国总统）的子女因渎职入狱。前总统前总统全斗焕(Chun Doo-hwan)和卢泰愚(Roh Tae-woo)在被查出向韩国几个最大企业集团索要数百万美元而入狱。

Mr Roh was thought to be different. He had campaigned all his political life against corruption. When he left office at the end of his five-year presidential term last year, he went back to his home village, enhancing his reputation as a man of the people.

在公众眼中，卢武铉更特殊，以为他在政治生涯中一贯反对腐败。在五年任期结束时，他于去年离职，回到家乡，这给他的平民形象更添光彩。

The son of poor farmers, Mr Roh had studied for the bar and then become a practising lawyer, becoming known as a people’s champion after defending students who had been arrested for protesting against Chun Doo-hwan, a dictatorial leader. Mr Roh gave up his law practice for politics in the mid-1980s, serving in the National Assembly, where he campaigned against corruption.

生于一个贫困的农民家庭，卢武铉学习法律，后来成为一名实习律师，在成功为为抗议当时的独裁总统全斗焕而被捕的学生辩护后，声名远扬，被誉为人民斗士。在19世纪90年代，卢武铉放弃法律生涯，从政，在国民大会中发起了反腐败运动。

That caught the attention of South Korea’s best known political figure, Kim Dae-jung. In 1997 Mr Roh organised Mr Kim’s successful presidential campaign. Five years later, Mr Roh surprised perhaps even himself in the race to be president by defeating the favoured establishment candidate, a former Supreme Court chief justice, Lee Hoi-chong. He did so by appealing to the modest aspirations of the poor, middle class and university students.

他因此引起了当时韩国最知名政治人物金大中的注意。1997年，卢武铉成功组织金大中参选总统活动。五年后，甚至出乎己料的，卢武铉打败呼声很高的总统候选人，前最高法院大法官李惠昌，当选总统。他的法宝就是在竞选中，他响应了穷苦人、中产阶级和大学生的诉求。

His term as president was tumultuous. The business community saw him as a leftist maverick intent on redistributing wealth by imposing progressive taxes. At one point he was impeached, accused of corruption, although he was not convicted.

他的总统任期是极不平静的。商界把他看做是左派，标新立异，企图通过征收累进税重新分配财富。他曾一度以为被指控腐败而遭到弹劾，尽管指控未成立。

Mr Roh, troubled by abuse of the highest office by his predecessors, sought to institute more checks and balances on the president and more forms of oversight. He continued the “Sunshine Policy” of Kim Dae-jung, which called for engagement of North Korea. He sought to deepen social, political and economic contacts with Pyongyang, the northern capital, to the disquiet of Washington. Meetings with the American leader were never relaxed, and although a free-trade agreement was signed between the two countries, and despite the presence of many American troops in South Korea, the alliance grew testy. In October 2007 Mr Roh went to Pyongyang, against the advice of George Bush’s White House. North Korea had exploded a nuclear bomb in 2006 and Washington did not want its ally shaking hands or signing agreements with Kim Jong Il.

前任总统们滥用职权给卢武铉带来了困扰，他试图建立更多的复查和平衡总统权利机制和更多的监督。他继续金大中的“阳光政策”，与朝鲜开展交往。他努力加强 与朝鲜首都平壤在社会、政治和经济方面的接触，这让美国很不安。那是，韩国与美国领导人的会见总是很紧张，尽管两国签订了自由贸易协定，且美国在韩国有大 量驻军，两国间的联盟关系仍充满变数。2007年10月，卢武铉不顾美国总统布什的意见，访问平壤。因为朝鲜已经在2006年试爆一颗原子弹，美国不希望 其盟友与金正日握手言和或签署什么协议。

Mr Roh’s efforts while in office to redistribute wealth were reversed by his successor, Lee Myung-bak, a former boss of the Hyundai Group. Mr Lee has also cooled relations with North Korea. South Korean tourist groups no longer travel across the heavily armed inter-Korean border. The future of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea, a joint venture between southern capital and northern labour, is in doubt following a series of capricious demands by Pyongyang. North Korea has said it will not return to six-party talks on ending its nuclear-weapons programme.

卢武铉在任期间推行的财富再分配政策被其继任者，现代前领导人李明博废止。李明博也冷却了与朝鲜的关系。也不再有韩国的旅游团扩过重兵把守的南北韩边界。 因为朝方要求变幻无常，由韩国提高资本，朝鲜提供劳动力合作成立的位于朝鲜境内的开城工业园前景堪忧。朝方已表示将不会就终止其核武器计划重返六方会谈。

In his retirement Mr Roh criticised his successor’s policies towards North Korea. At his village he began to reclaim some of his former popularity. His home became popular among tourists and the former president would often greet holiday-makers at his front gate. But in April, on his website under the heading, “I Apologise”, Mr Roh said that he had requested, received and used money from a businessman. He said that he had a “debt to repay”. Mr Roh may have accepted at least $6m and numerous gifts through family members and former aides. In time his reputation may recover somewhat, but locals are unimpressed. “Before this incident I thought he was a clean president and I respected him. I have changed my mind”, says Park Song-deuk, a resident of Mr Roh’s village.

退休后，卢武铉曾批判过他的继任者的对朝政策。在家乡小村里， 他回复了一些先前的荣誉。他的家乡成了旅游胜地，这位前总统经常在家门前欢迎前来度假的人们。但是在4月份，他在其网站上发布一条消息，标题为“道歉”。 他说：“他曾想一名商人索要并接受和使用钱财”，他说他“有债要还”。卢武铉可能默认通过其家人和助手至少收受了600万美元现金和大量的礼品。通过此 举，他可能回复了一些名声，但是同乡们并不买账。卢武铉家乡村里的一位村民表示“在此事件前，我认为他是位廉洁的总统，我尊敬他，现在我不那么人为了”。

The oil price

Bust and boom
萧条与繁荣
May 22nd 2009
From Economist.com

The price of oil has leapt to nearly $62 a barrel. Another spike may be on the way
石油价格已升至每桶近62美元，可能还会继续飙升。



RISING oil prices, believes Ali al-Naimi, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, may soon “take the wheels off an already derailed world economy”. On the face of things, this concern is absurd. The plunge of $115 in the price of oil from its peak last July to its nadir in December was the most precipitous the world has ever seen. Demand for oil is still falling, as the world economy atrophies. Rumours abound of traders hiring tankers to store their excess oil. Rich countries’ stocks cover 62 days’ consumption, the most since 1993 (see chart 1). The average over the past five years has been 52 days’ worth.
沙特阿拉伯石油部长阿里.纳伊米认为，上涨的石油价格可能很快使已经脱轨的世界经济之车又失去轮子。乍一看，这种担忧很荒谬。去年，油价经历了最为大幅的 下跌，从去年7月每桶115美元的峰值骤跌至12月的最低点。世界经济在萎缩，对石油的需求仍在下降。盛传石油交易商租用油轮储藏过剩石油。富国的石油储 备可供62天的消费，创1993年以来最高水平。（见图1）。而过去5年的平均水平是52天。

Nor are oil firms pumping nearly as much as they could. OPEC has announced three separate rounds of production cuts since September in a bid to steady prices. In all, it has vowed to trim its output by 4.2m barrels a day (b/d). That leaves them with as much as 6m b/d of spare capacity. Despite this growing glut, however, the price of oil has been rising steadily in recent weeks (see chart 2). On Wednesday May 20th it closed above $60 a barrel for the first time in more than six months. That marks an increase of more than 75% since February. The price of futures contracts suggests that energy traders see the price rising higher still in the coming months and years. (During the day on Friday it appeared to be nearing $62 a barrel.)
石油公司也不是尽其所能地开采石油。自9月以来，石油输出国组织（OPEC）已宣布3轮减产，以求平稳油价。 OPEC共计承诺每天减少420万桶的产量。这使得石油输出国每天剩余生产能力达600万桶。尽管供给过剩，但近几周油价却稳步上升（见表2）。5月20 日（星期三），石油价格升至每桶60美元，创 6个月以来最高；标志着自2月以来，上涨超过75%。而期货价格下跌表明，能源交易商认为在未来几个月或几年内，石油价格仍将上升。（周五，石油价格似逼 近每桶62美元）

The explanation is simple. Oilmen are worried because they believe that many of the factors behind the record-breaking ascent last year remain in place. Much of the world’s “easy” oil has already been extracted, or is in the hands of nationalist governments that will not allow foreigners to exploit it. That leaves firms to hunt for new reserves in ever more inhospitable and inaccessible places, such as the deep waters off Africa or the frozen oceans of the Arctic. Such fields take a long time and a lot of expensive technology to develop. Worse, new discoveries tend to be smaller than in the past and to run dry faster.
理由显而易见。石油商忧心忡忡，认为去年导致石油价格破记录攀升的很多因素依然存在。全球大部分好开采的石油或已被开采，或被掌控在国家主义政府的手中， 不允许外国公司开采。所以石油公司不得不到诸如非洲的深水水域和北极冰冻的海洋等更不好客、更加艰苦的地区探寻新的储备。而在这些地方开采石油耗费的时间 更长，需要运用很多昂贵的技术。更糟的是，新探明的储量往往比以前更小，也更快开采完。

So oil firms must work doubly hard to replace declining fields and to increase output. Yet the oil industry is short of equipment and manpower, thanks to underinvestment in the 1980s and 1990s, when prices were low. As soon as the world economy starts growing again, the theory runs, demand for oil will once again outstrip the industry’s ability to supply it. In other words, the global recession has only interrupted the “supercycle” of which many analysts used to speak, during which the normal boom-and-bust cycle of oil and other commodities would give way to a protracted period of high prices, as ever-growing demand from emerging markets swallowed everything the extractive industries could produce.
所以石油公司必须加倍努力以弥补油田产量下降的不足，提高产出。但是石油业又缺少设备和人力，这是因为上世纪八、九十年代石油价格偏低时，对石油业的投资 不足造成的。根据相关理论，当世界经济重新开始增长时，对石油的需求将再次超过石油业的供给能力。换言之，全球衰退只是打断了很多分析师所说的“超级循环 周期”。在这循环中，普通的关于石油和其他大宗商品的繁荣-萧条循环周期会让步于长时间的高价位，因为新兴市场始终增长的需求消化了开采业所能开采的所有 产品。

Oil bosses, OPEC ministers and anxious bankers all agree on what is needed to prevent this scenario becoming reality: lavish investment in the development of new fields and in exploration. Yet the reverse is happening. The oil industry is cutting its spending, bringing fewer new fields into production and exploring less. The International Energy Agency reckons that overall investment will drop by 15-20% this year.
石油业老总、OPEC 部长们和迫切的银行家们对于应该如何防范这一现象的发生达成了共识：要在勘探和开采新油田上投入巨资。然而事与愿违。石油业正在减少开支，开采更少的新油田，降低开采量。国际能源署认为，今年的总投资将会减少15-20%。

In theory, this should not be happening. Big Western oil firms (“majors” in the industry jargon) claim that they continue to invest steadily throughout the cycle, irrespective of gyrations in price. Big fields, they argue, can take a decade or more to develop, and may then produce oil or gas for several decades more. The price of oil at the time the investment is approved is irrelevant; the important thing is to make sure projects will be profitable across a range of possible future prices. If anything, given that most oilmen expect prices to rise in the medium term, you would expect them to be increasing their investment, to capitalise on the good times to come. Nonetheless, the extreme volatility of prices over the past year must have made big firms more cautious about future investments.
理论上而言，上述现象不应发生。西方大型石油公司（用行话讲是“巨头”）声称，不管石油价格如何波动，仍将在循环周期内继续稳定投资。他们称，大油田需要 10年或更长的时间来开采，而可能产出的油气可供几十年之需。批准投资时的油价并不重要，重要的是在考虑价格波动因素之后，投资的项目是否依然能盈利。若真是这样的话，因为多数石油商期望油价在中期上升，所以你可以指望他们增加投资，为美好的前景注资。尽管如此，过去一年中石油价格极度动荡，必然导致大公司对未来投资更为谨慎。

Then there are the state-owned firms in oil-soaked countries. These companies control the overwhelming majority of the world’s oil. The better managed and funded of them plan to continue investing despite the downturn. Saudi Aramco, the world’s biggest oil producer, recently completed a five-year scheme to expand its production capacity from 10m b/d to 12.5m b/d, at a cost of $70 billion. But in Russia, the world’s second-biggest oil producer, output is falling largely because private capital has been scared off by a series of expropriations, while the state starves the firms it controls of sufficient cash for investment. And most oil-rich states, naturally enough, are happy to see the price rise. Many have become used to bumper revenues in recent years and have struggled to balance their budgets since the price slumped last year.
盛产油国的国有公司控制着世界上大部分的石油。其中经营较好，资金充足的公司在经济下滑的时候计划继续投资。全球最大的石油生产商，沙特阿美公司近来完成 了的一个5年计划，将投入700亿美元，使其生产能力从1000万桶/每天提高到1250万桶/每天。但在全球第二大石油生产国俄罗斯，私有资本被一系列 征收而吓跑，石油产出大幅下跌。国家让公司挨饿，手上却握着充足的现金。很自然，多数石油丰富的国家都乐于看到油价上涨。很多国家已经习惯近年来收入飙 升，而自从去年油价下跌后，已开始挣扎着要平衡预算了。

Falling costs within the industry will offset the impact of falling investment budgets to some extent. BP argues its slight cut in investment does not really represent a reduction, thanks to deflation. Yet many constraints on expansion remain. For one thing, the world still does not have as many experienced petroleum engineers and geologists as it needs, says Iain Manson of Korn/Ferry, a recruiting firm. He expects it to take a decade or more to overcome the shortage. Meanwhile, he says, wages in the oil industry are not falling by nearly as much as other costs.
石油业成本下降将会从某种程度上抵消投资下降的影响。英国石油公司（BP）声辩，考虑到通货紧缩，其小幅减少投资并不代表真正的减资。但还存在很多约束扩 张的因素。光辉国际（Korn /Ferry，招聘公司）的艾恩.曼森认为，其中一个因素就是世界仍缺乏经验丰富的石油工程师和地质学家。他预期填补这一空缺还需要10年或更长的时间。 同时，石油业的工资却不像其它成本那样下降得多。

Worse, there is little sign that governments are willing to grant oil companies easier access to the most promising territory for exploration. Iraq’s plans to sign big new contracts with foreign firms are years behind schedule, as is its new oil law. American sanctions continue to impede investment in Iran. The Nigerian government has been unable to quell the insurgency in the Niger delta, making it difficult for oil firms to operate there. Even in America, despite years of debate, most coastal waters and much of Alaska remain off-limits to drilling.
更糟的是，鲜有迹象表明政府愿意给石油公司提供便利，帮助他们开采更有前景的区域。伊拉克本计划与外国公司签署新的大合同，但现在落后于计划几年，正如伊的新石油法一样。美国的制裁继续妨碍在伊朗的投资。尼日利亚政府不能平息尼日尔三角洲的***，使得石油公司很难在当地作业。甚至在美国，尽管争论了多年，但多数沿海水域以及阿拉斯加沿岸仍然禁止钻井。

So when demand begins to revive, a sharp rise in prices is inevitable. That does not mean that a price spike is just around the corner, however. The speed with which it arrives will depend on the strength of the global recovery. For the moment, global consumption of oil continues to fall, despite the slight brightening of the economic outlook. At the recent OPEC powwow Mr al-Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, argued that a low oil price always sowed the seeds of a future price rise, since it led to underinvestment. The only question this time is how quickly the strain will emerge.
因此，当需求开始复苏时，价格将不可避免地迅速飙升。但这并不意味着石油价格马上就会上扬。至于油价以多块的速度上涨，将取决于全球复苏的力度。当前，尽 管经济前景出现些许光明，全球石油消费却继续下滑。今日在OPEC会议上，沙特石油部长纳伊米认为，低油价会导致投资不足，从而为将来油价上涨播下种子。 目前，唯一的问题是，这种投资紧张的状况多快会显现出来。