Economic indicators 经济指标

Googling the future   Google一下未来

Apr 16th 2009

From The Economist print edition

Internet search data may be useful for forecasters

网络搜索数据也许可以帮助经济预测专家

CLAIMS of clairvoyance, particularly when they come from economists, deserve a sceptical reception. Hal Varian, a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley who also happens to be Google’s chief economist, has no such pretensions, but he does believe that data on internet searches can help predict certain kinds of economic statistics before they become available.

人们具有预见能力的这一说，尤其是经济学家的预见能力通常都会引起质疑。加州大学伯克利分校的经济学教授，谷歌公司首席经济学家Hal Varian表示，他没有如此的洞察力和预见力，但他相信在某些经济统计数据公布之前，网络搜索的数据能够帮助预测这些数据。

In a new paper written with Hyunyoung Choi, a colleague at Google, he argues that fluctuations in the frequency with which people search for certain words or phrases online can improve the accuracy of the econometric models used to predict, for example, retail-sales figures or house sales. Actual numbers for such things are usually available only with a lag. But Google’s search data are updated every day, so they can in theory capture shifts in consumer behaviour before official numbers are released.

Varian和谷歌的另一名同事Hyunyoung Choi最 新发表了一篇论文，他表示对于人们在网上搜索的一些字词短语，其频率的变化可以提高经济计量模型预测零售销售或售房数据的准确性。这些确切销售数据通常是 要滞后一段时间才能得到。但是谷歌搜索数据每天都在更新，因此理论上在官方数字出炉之前，们就把握住了消费者行为的变化。

These data are available through a site called Google Trends, which allows anyone who cares to do so to download an index of the aggregate volume of searches for particular terms or categories. Mr Varian and Mr Choi show that the addition of these search trends to econometric models improves the accuracy of their estimates.

人们可以在一个名叫谷歌趋势的网站上得到这些数据，并且可以下载特定条款或物品被搜索总量的指数。Varian和Choi表示，共同利用这些搜索趋势和经济计量模型就能够提高预测的准确性。

For example, using data on searches for trucks and SUVs to predict the monthly sales of motor vehicles reduces the average error by up to 18% compared with the predictions from a model that did not incorporate the search data. The volume of searches for Hong Kong carried out in countries like America, Britain, Australia and India also seems to predict eventual tourist arrivals to the territory from these countries rather well.

比如，与不用搜索数据的模型得出的预测相比，利用货车和SUV的搜索数据来预测汽车月销售量会减少高达18%的平均误差。在美国，英国，澳大利亚和印度等国进行的对香港的搜索似乎也能预测从这些国家到香港旅行的游客人数。

How widely could this idea be applied? For some things, like retail sales, the categories into which Google classifies its search-trend data correspond closely to what people may want to predict, such as the sales of a particular brand of car (see chart). For others, like sales of houses, things are less clear. It appears that searches for estate agents work better than those for home financing. But anything that makes the crystal ball less cloudy is welcome.

这 一方法的应用有多广？对于一些事物，比如零售销售，某些种类（谷歌将搜索趋势数据划分到该种类）和人们期望预测的事物非常相关，比如某一种汽车品牌的销 售。对于其它的项目，如房屋销售，情况就比较模糊。但对房地产经纪人的搜索似乎比对房屋抵押贷款机构的搜索更能清楚地说明房屋销售问题。无论如何，，只要 能使这个水晶球更加透明清晰，任何方法都是受人欢迎的。

本帖最后由 cag789 于 2009-4-9 09:50 编辑

Private equity
私募股权

Flip flop
生意反反复复、起起落落

Apr 6th 2009
From Economist.com

The private-equity industry is chastened but still alive
私募股权行业发展受阻，残喘求生。

GIVEN the private-equity industry's dire track record of late, it is a surprise that it can raise any new money at all. Yet in the first quarter of 2009 investors handed over $46 billion, well below the dizzy extremes of the bubble, but still on a par with the levels of five years ago. Half of this was directed to buy-out funds. That might make some sense—these funds have historically performed better during bear markets, when they can buy companies on the cheap. Still, private-equity firms now have their work cut out to prove that they were not just another manifestation of an unsustainable debt bubble.

私募股权行业近来表现不佳。这一行当最近还能继续筹集新资金，的确让人 大吃一惊。2009年第1季度。投资者还是向私募股权公司吐出了460亿美元。虽然这一数字远远低于泡沫经济时期的高峰值，但仍可以和5年前的筹资水平相 媲美。460亿美金的一半，集中投资在并购基金上。这种做法不无道理，以往熊市中，并购基金的确表现不俗。发生股灾，正好低价收购公司。尽管可以通过买并 购基金大捡便宜，私募股权行业还是需要好好工作，好好办事，向投资者证明：他们不代表另一个债务泡沫，他们可以持续赚钱。

全球私募股权基金历年筹资表现

Grow, grow, grow
扩大，扩大，扩大
Intel still appears to stick to this mantra, and is using the crisis to outgrow its competitors. In February Paul Otellini, its chief executive, said it would speed up plans to move many of its fabs to a new, 32-nanometre process at a cost of $7 billion over the next two years. This, he said, would preserve about 7,000 high-wage jobs in America. The investment (as well as Nehalem, Intel’s new superfast chip for servers, which was released on March 30th) will also make life even harder for AMD, Intel’s biggest remaining rival in the market for PC-type processors.

Intel一直恪守着这个信条，并利用危机来超过它的竞争者。在二月，它的总裁Paul Otellini说Intel将加速计划—在接下来的两年了花费70亿美元转移他的多数晶圆厂为新的32纳米制程。他说此举将会在美国保持大约7000个 高薪职位。这项投资将（涉及Nehalem[4]，4月30日发布的Intel最新告诉处理器芯片）会使AMD的生存更为艰难，而AMD为Intel在 PC处理器市场最大的现存竞争对手。

Two other long-term developments also point towards further concentration of chipmaking. The first is technological change beyond that ordained by Moore’s Law. Fully automated “lights-out” fabs are in operation. Within a few years fabs will be producing wafers with a diameter of 450mm, up from 300mm now, making them even more productive. “When the industry goes to 450mm and this happens at 22 or even 11 nanometres, it is conceivable to have one factory handle all our needs as a company,” says Mr Otellini. He adds, however, that Intel would never put all its eggs in one basket.

另外两项长期发展也指向进一步的芯片制造集聚。首先是技术变革超出摩尔定律的藩篱。完全自动化的“熄灯” 晶圆厂处于运作中。在几年之内，晶圆厂将生产出直径为四百五十毫米的晶圆，超出现在的300毫米，从而进一步提高产能。“当行业进入四百五十毫米时代，同 时技术达到22甚至11纳米，可以想象到的是一个工厂就可以满足我们一个企业的所有需要，” Otellini先生谈到。但他也强调Intel从来不会把所有鸡蛋放入一个篮子里。

The other development is the maturing of the industry. Its annual growth has slid from double digits in the mid-1990s to an average of around 5% since then. And since 2004 the profitability of chip firms has dropped steadily as many chipmakers have lowered prices to expand their markets. In the future, only three types of semiconductor firm will make a decent return, predicts Mr Lidow: those with unique intellectual property; those happy to make commodity chips; and those with enough cash to achieve unprecedented scale.

另一个发展是产业的成熟。产业的年增长率已经从20世纪90年代中期的二位数滑落到今天的平均5%。并且从2004年，由于很多芯片制造商降低价格扩大市 场，使得芯片企业的收益率平稳下降。Lidow先生预测：在将来，只有三种半导体企业能做到体面回落—有独立知识产权的，乐于制造日用品芯片的，有足够的 现金来发展空前的规模的。

How far will consolidation go? High-ranking executives at leading firms, who prefer not to be quoted, give similar answers. In the long run, they say, there will be only three viable entities, at least at the leading edge of chipmaking: Samsung in memory chips, Intel in microprocessors and TSMC in foundries. The rest will be “nationalistic” ventures in need of regular government bail-outs.

这种合并将会走多远？一个不远披露姓名的龙头企业的高级管理人员给予了相似答案。他认为在长远看来，只会存在三个可维持的实体，至少在领先的芯片制造领 域：三星在内存芯片制造领域，Intel在微处理器领域，台积电在晶圆代工领域。剩下的都将是由政府定期投资来挽救的“民族企业”。

Yet such predictions may be a little off the mark. Largely because of that nationalism, the semiconductor industry is unlikely to end up as a bunch of near-monopolies. The Taiwanese are unlikely to let the South Koreans rule the memory roost. The newly founded Taiwan Memory Company (TMC), which is to take over the six local firms, could become the core of a global memory giant. It will hook up with Elpida Memory, Japan’s sole maker of memory chips. TMC is also said to be interested in Qimonda.

然而，这些预测也许并非千真万确。主要是因为国家主义，使得半导体工业最终不可能由垄断企业把持。台湾人不可能让韩国掌控本土内存芯片。新成立的台湾内存 公司（TMC）将要接管6个本土企业，可能会成为全球存储巨头的核心。它将与日本唯一的内存制造企业尔必达内存（Elpida Memory）联合。也有传言说TMC也对奇梦达有兴趣。


Bloomberg Precious pizza
彭博的超昂贵“披萨”

As for microprocessors, in the fast-growing market for netbooks and other mobile devices, Intel has to do battle with many “fabless” firms, most of which build chips based on designs by ARM, a British company. What is more, after spinning off manufacturing, “our customers no longer have to ask: is AMD able to invest in the next generation of manufacturing?” says Dirk Meyer, the firm’s chief executive. And Abu Dhabi’s investment in Globalfoundries is part not just of its preparations for the post-oil age, but also of a long-term plan to create a “global” alternative to foundries in Taiwan and mainland China. The company will build a fab in New York state and perhaps one day in the Gulf state.

来看微处理器，在快速增长的网络书和其他移动设备市场，Intel已经与很多“无生产线 ”企业展开了争斗。大部分“无生产线”企业制造的芯片基于英国公司ARM的设计。此外，在分拆生产后，“我们的客户不再需要问：AMD公司能够投资于下一 代的制造吗？”AMD总裁Dirk Meyer说。同时，阿布扎比在全球晶圆代工厂上的投资不仅仅是为了应对后-石油时代，也是一个长期计划，创造晶圆代工厂在台湾和中国大陆之外的又一个全 球性选择。该公司将在纽约州建立工厂，也许有一天在海湾国家。

Whatever the precise number of firms, the semiconductor industry will be highly concentrated and much of it will be dominated by Asian companies. Does this matter? From a purely economic standpoint, probably not much. The industry’s extreme capital-intensity is certainly a barrier to entry, and in theory a market with only a few suppliers is ripe for rigging. But chipmakers are unlikely to be able to extract a disproportionate rent or restrict supply—or even to try. For one thing, the industry has a history of intense competition. This is especially fierce among Asian national champions, for which prestige plays a big role. More important, the global production network of the information-technology industry is much too interdependent. If foundries, for instance, took a much larger piece of the pie, others in the value chain, such as chip designers, would find it hard to survive.

无论企业的精确数目是多少，半导体行业将会高度集中，同时其中的大部分将被亚洲企业控制。这有什么问题吗？从纯经济学的观点看，可能并不多。该行业的极端资本集约度是外人进入的阻碍，从理论上说只存在少量供应商的市场是操纵起来成 熟的。但芯片制造商们不可能提取不成比例租金或限制供应，或甚至尝试。其一，该行业有剧烈竞争的历史。这在亚洲国家冠军之间尤其猛烈，而声望起到很大的作 用。更为重要的，信息制造行业的全球制造网络相互依赖。例如，如果晶圆代工厂拿走了太大的一块蛋糕，价值链上的其它业者如芯片设计者将会很难生存。

From a political perspective, the shift towards Asia could matter much more—especially for Europe. Although America has lost much of the “back end” of chipmaking—the packing and testing—to Asia, it still is the home of many leading-edge fabs, notably those run by Intel. Intel’s finances, thanks to its dominance, are still healthy, but the big European chip firms such as STMicroelectronics (revenues of $9.8 billion in 2008), Infineon Technologies ($6 billion) and NXP Semiconductors ($5.4 billion) are struggling. NXP has just announced a financial restructuring to lighten its debt burden of nearly $6 billion.

从政治角度，转向亚洲将会导致一些问题—尤其是对欧洲。虽然美国已经失去了大部分的芯片制造“后端”—包装和测试—转移到亚洲，但其仍然掌握着很多领先的 晶圆厂，特别是那些由Intel运营的。由于其主导地位，Intel的财政仍然保持健康；但大型欧洲芯片企业，例如意法半导体 （STMicroelectronics）（2008年收入98亿美元），英飞凌科技（Infineon Technologies）（60亿美元），NXP半导体（NXP Semiconductors）（54亿美元），都在挣扎中。NXP刚刚公布了财务重组，以减轻其近60亿美元的债务负担。

Worse, over the past ten years Europe’s market share in semiconductors has dropped from more than 23% to about 15%, according to Future Horizons, a consultancy. A recent report by the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA), a lobbying group, listed some of the reasons for this erosion: the appreciation of the euro, much more generous subsidies in other regions and lagging R&D spending. If governments do not act soon, the report concludes, chipmakers will continue to migrate elsewhere and put Europe’s competitiveness at risk.

更不利的是，根据顾问机构Future Horizons的说法，过去十年的欧洲半导体市场份额从23%降到15%。游说团体欧洲半导体产业协会（ESIA）最近所做的一个报告列出了导致腐蚀的一系列原因：欧元升值，其它地区更为慷慨的补贴金，落后的研发投入。该报告的结论是，如果政府仍然不扮演相应角色，芯片制造商将继续转移到别处并使得欧洲的竞争力处于危险中。

Although sophisticated chips are an essential ingredient of many European exports, from cars to medical equipment, the answer is unlikely to be a splurge of taxpayers’ money. A lot has already been spent on manufacturing, to create jobs. But this approach will work even less well in the future. Trying to draw level with Asia in chipmaking would be futile.

虽然精密芯片是很多欧洲出口品的核心要素，从汽车到医疗设备，但答案是不可能去挥霍纳税人的金钱。为了增加就业，已经在制造业上花费了很多钱。但这种做法将收效甚微。因为试图与亚洲芯片制造比肩将会是徒劳的。

What is more, although there has been a lack of spending on research, the real problem has been a lack of successful commercialisation. What Europe’s semiconductor industry—and its technology sector as a whole, for that matter—badly needs is a better environment for entrepreneurs, says Dan Breznitz of the Georgia Institute of Technology, a specialist in the global IT industry. Because Europe’s semiconductor industry has been dominated by big, hierarchical companies, fabless firms are still rare. In Israel, by contrast, with its newly entrepreneurial culture, they have multiplied. Europe, argues Mr Breznitz, is still too focused on manufacturing.

更重要的是，虽然一直缺乏研发支出，但真正的问题是一直没有成功的商业化。Dan Breznitz说欧洲的半导体行业和它的全体研究部门在这种恶劣环境下需要的是营造的更好创业环境。Dan Breznitz来自佐治亚理工学院（Georgia Institute of Technology），是全球IT行业的专家。因为欧洲的半导体行业一直被大的、层次化的公司控制，无生产线公司依然很少。对比而言，在以色列，因为它的新型创业文化，已经有了很大发展。欧洲，认为Breznitz认为 ，仍然过于关注制造业。

Europe could stage a comeback, some say, should an old idea finally take off: “mini-fabs”—small, flexible and agile production units. Such a revolution has happened before, in steel: giantism once seemed insuperable, yet today plenty of steel is made in “mini-mills”, which use scrap as raw material. Might the foundries of the information age one day be under a similar threat? Maybe. But experts are right to be sceptical: transistors may get ever smaller, but in chipmaking scale rules.

有些人说，使用个老方法将使得欧洲重返舞台，这就是“迷你-晶圆厂”—制造小的、灵活的、轻巧的产品单元。这样的革命曾经在钢铁行业发生过：巨无霸型企业 看似不可战胜的，然而今天很多的钢材由使用废铁作为原材料的“小钢铁厂”制造。信息时代的代工厂有一天也会处于相似的威胁下吗？或许吧。但专家有权利怀 疑：晶体管会越来越小，但仍处于芯片制造的规模规则下。




[1] iSuppli 是一家全球领先的针对电子制造领域的市场研究公司。 iSuppli 通过提供有关战略性和战术性的信息、分析、建议和工具，帮助原始设备生产商 (OEM) ，电子制造业服务 (EMS) 供应商，原始设计制造商 (ODM) 和元器件供应商减低成本和改善供应链性能。
援引 http://baike.baidu.com/view/1708103.htm
[2] 杰里•桑德斯（Jerry Sanders,1936.9.12- ）——AMD的创始人 。半导体产业先驱人物，创办AMD，与英特尔展开30多年艰苦卓绝的竞争，打破了CPU市场的垄断地位，为PC产业的发展和繁荣作出了巨大的贡献。
援引 http://baike.baidu.com/view/453049.htm
[3] 戈登•摩尔   1929年出生于旧金山，1954年获得加州工学院化学物理博士学位。1965年提出“摩尔定律”， 1968年创办Intel公司，1987年将CEO的位置交给格鲁夫。1990年被布什总统授予“国家技术奖”， 2000年创办拥有50亿美元资产的基金会。2001年退休，退出Intel的董事会。
援引 http://baike.baidu.com/view/450856.html?wtp=tt
[4] Nehalem 是美国俄勒冈州波特兰市的一个小小的卫星城,在此处是英特尔新一代CPU微架构的代码。关于Nehalem的正确表述应该是：全新的酷睿微架构。该微架构为下一代微处理器加入了更多有关提高性能，节能控制，多处理器扩展能力以及能效均衡的设计。
参考 http://blogs.intel.com/china/2008/09/nehalem_1.php

The semiconductor industry
半导体行业

Under new management
处于洗牌中
Apr 2nd 2009 | DRESDEN
From The Economist print edition

Chipmakers were suffering even before the global economic downturn. Recession is heightening the pain and highlighting changes in structure and ownership
在全球经济低迷之前，芯片制造业者已经处于危机中。经济危机的到来更加加剧了这种痛苦，并使得芯片制造业在产业结构和所有制方面的转变迫在眉睫。



MOST tourists come to Dresden to view the city’s architectural wonders. Beautifully rebuilt, the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady), for instance, reveals no hint that its huge cupola once crumbled after a rain of British bombs. But the capital of the German state of Saxony also has more contemporary attractions—at least for technically inclined travellers. It is the hub of one of Europe’s biggest technology clusters. Silicon Saxony, as the region has come to be called, boasts 1,500 high-tech firms employing 43,000 people, most of them in the semiconductor industry.

大多数游客来到德累斯顿（Dresden），是为了观赏城市中的建筑奇迹。譬如，Frauenkirche （圣母教堂），它在战后被完美的重建了，以至于没有留下巨大圆顶阁楼曾被英军的狂轰滥炸摧毁过的蛛丝马迹。但是德国萨克森州的首府[即德累斯顿]也同样不乏当代的名胜——至少对于爱好技术的游客们来说如此。事实上，它是欧洲最大科学技术密集区的枢纽—1500高科技企业以及他们的43000员工聚集此处，其中大多数从事半导体行业，也因此，德累斯顿被尊称为硅-萨克森（Silicon Saxony）。

Yet industrial tourists had better hurry. Recently Silicon Saxony has taken some hits that have weakened its foundations. On April 1st Qimonda, a maker of memory chips and the cluster’s largest employer, mothballed its factory, having been forced into insolvency earlier this year. Its last hope is to be bought by an outside investor lured by money from the Saxon government. Inspur, a Chinese computer-maker, is among those expressing interest in Qimonda, which has developed some cutting-edge technology.

然而工业旅游者得抓紧时间了。硅-萨克森最近受到的一些打击已经消弱了他的地位。四月一日，地区最大雇主，存储芯片制造厂商奇梦达（Qimonda）关闭 了他的工厂，在今年早些，它已经被迫破产。它的最后希望是被外部投资者收购，因为来自萨克森政府的补贴金仍然对投资者具有吸引力。众多投资者表达了对已经 发展了一定先进技术的奇梦达的兴趣，其中包括中国电脑制造商浪潮集团（Inspur）。

At Dresden’s other big “fab”, as chip-fabrication plants are called, is an indicator of another change that may prove just as damaging. There is a new logo at the entrance: visitors are no longer welcomed to AMD but to Globalfoundries. AMD, a maker of microprocessors for personal computers (PCs), decided last year to spin off its fabs into a separate company and to sell a majority stake to investment funds controlled by the government of Abu Dhabi. A good deal of production, some fret, may eventually move from Dresden to the Gulf.

在德累斯顿的另外一个被称为芯片制造工厂的大晶圆厂则表现了一种纯粹破坏性的的改变。在它的入口处有一个新LOGO：欢迎客户来到环球晶圆代工 （Globalfoundries）而不是AMD。个人PC微处理器制造商AMD去年决定把晶圆厂分拆到单独的公司，并把多数股份卖给阿布扎比（Abu Dhabi）政府把持的投资基金。有些人担心大量的生产可能将最终从德累斯顿转移到海湾地区。

The likely death of Qimonda and the birth of Globalfoundries* have turned Silicon Saxony into an industrial showcase of a very different kind. It is a visible token of how hard recession around the world has hit the semiconductor industry, which had already been weakened by one of its periodic downturns. Just as important, it demonstrates the longer-term upheavals in the industry. The semiconductor business is becoming less vertically integrated and more concentrated. And its centre of gravity is shifting eastwards.

奇梦达的临近消亡和环球晶圆代工厂的出现已经置硅-萨克森于一种工业展示的奇异境地。而这正是全球经济不景气打击本已受到周期性低迷影响的半导体行业的明显标志。同样重要的，它也是行业长期巨变的明证。半导体业务正从纵向一体化向更多的集聚转变，并且它的重心正向东方转移。



Despite a few signs that the worst may be over—Asian chipmakers’ share prices soared recently after shortages were predicted—the industry is still in the midst of the longest slump in its 50-year history. If market researchers are right, it will shrink again in 2009 before resuming growth in 2010. iSuppli, one such forecaster, thinks that revenues will fall by more than 20% this year, to $205 billion (see chart 1). Other observers have been making similarly gloomy predictions.

在普遍预言萧条之时，亚洲芯片制造商近期股价飞涨，这成为少有的显示最坏时期可能结束的标志；除此不论，整个行业仍处于其50年历史中持续最久的低谷之中。如果市场调研正确，在2010年回复增长之前的2009年，半导体行业将会再次收缩。持有如上预测的iSuppli[1]公司认为今年的相关收入将会同比下降20%，为2050亿美元（见图一）。其它观察家也有相似悲观预见。

To understand why the semiconductor industry has been so pummelled, think of integrated circuits (ie, chips) not as tiny pieces of silicon engraved with millions of transistors, but as an essential resource. Before long every man-made object will come with at least one embedded microchip (see chart 2). Jerry Sanders, AMD’s founder, once called chips “the crude oil of industry”. This seems apt: integrated circuits have become the grease of the information economy. The flip side is that chipmakers have come to depend increasingly on the health of the rest of the economy.

为了解半导体行业为何受到如此沉重打击，应想到集成电路（即芯片）并不仅仅是用成百万晶体管雕刻的小硅片，而更是一种基础资源。不久之后，任何人造物都将 被植入至少一个微芯片（见图二）。AMD创始人杰里•桑德斯[2]（Jerry Sanders）曾经称芯片为“工业的原油”。这似乎容易想到：集成电路已经变成信息经济的润滑剂。另一面，芯片制造商也日益依赖于其它经济方面的健康状 态。



The chip cycle
芯片周期
However, the industry’s own economics are also to blame. Even without the world’s wider troubles, these would have caused problems. In explaining how, Dan Hutcheson, chief executive of VLSI Research, a consultancy, likens semiconductor manufacturing to a different industry: farming. Investment decisions have to be made long before products can be sold. Chip farmers have to spend billions and wait years before they can start etching circuits onto “wafers”, those thin disks of semiconductor material, the size of pizzas, which are sliced into hundreds of chips at the end of the production process.

然而，行业自身的经济情况也应受到指责，即使没有全球性的危机，这也会导致问题产生。为了解释这个问题，作为顾问的VLSI总裁Dan Hutcheson把半导体制造业比作另一个行业—农业。远在产品能销售之前，投资决定已经做出。芯片农夫不得不花数十亿美元并等待数年直到能开始在晶圆 片上雕刻电路。晶圆是由半导体材料制成的披萨饼尺寸超薄原片，在生产流程的最后阶段被切割成成百的芯片。

This goes a long way towards explaining why chipmakers, like farmers, have a tendency to oversupply the market, particularly if they sell memory chips, an undifferentiated product (like winter wheat). Even if prices fall below costs, they have an interest in keeping their fabs humming, in order not to lose their heavy upfront investment and to recover the variable costs. What is more, they are caught on a “technology treadmill”, in the words of Mr Hutcheson. Competition forces them always to employ the latest technology, which both increases output and puts pressure on prices.

这里走了一大段长路来解释为什么芯片制造者像农夫般有过度供给市场的倾向，同时这种倾向在他们出售电脑芯片这种无差别产品（类似冬小麦）时更为明显。为了 避免损失前面的大宗投资并回收可变成本，即使价格低于成本，他们也十分在意他们的晶圆厂处在继续运行中。更重要的是，用Hutcheson先生的话说，他 们被“技术跑步机”俘虏了。竞争促使他们总是去采用最先进的技术，这在增加产出的同时，也加大了价格上的压力。

Finally, just as in agriculture, governments further fuel this innate tendency to oversupply. In prestige, national security, industrial policy or just a desire to create jobs, politicians have always found a reason to support their semiconductor industries, mostly with cash. Silicon Saxony, for instance, has received more than euro1.5 billion (nearly $2 billion at today’s exchange rate) from the state of Saxony alone, much of it to coax AMD into investing.

最后，如同农业，政府进一步推动了过度共给的固有趋势。虽然大体上是为了钱，但政客总能找到相当的理由来支持半导体工业，如声望，国家安全，工业政策或仅 仅是促进就业。譬如，硅-萨克森单从萨克森州就已经得到超过15亿欧元（当今汇率下约等20亿美元）的财政支持，其中很大一部分用于劝诱AMD继续投资。

Asian governments have been the most active. Thanks to Taiwan’s industrial policy, more than half of the world’s chips are now made there. Support from the South Korean government made Samsung and Hynix the world’s biggest makers of memory chips; they supply about 50% of this segment. China seems intent on turning its semiconductor companies into market leaders at almost any price, above all Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, or SMIC. All this explains why of the 40 fabs under construction in 2007, 35 were in Asia, three in America and only two in Europe.

亚洲政府已经是最活跃的了。由于台湾的工业政策，世界上超过半数的芯片在此制造。同时，在韩国政府的支持下，三星和现代成为世界最大的内存芯片制造商，提供世界该产品总量的50%。中国政府似乎决心付出任何代价将他的半导体公司转变为市场领导者，首先是中芯国际，即SMIC。所有这些解释了为什么2007年兴建的40个晶圆厂有35个在亚洲，3个在美国，只有两个在欧洲。

Not surprisingly, at times supply far outstrips demand. From 2002 until last year Asian makers of memory chips, especially, invested as if capital were free—which explains why everybody is now bleeding money. In July 2007 the price of a DRAM (dynamic random access memory) chip with a capacity of 512 megabits was more than $2. In early April it was about 50 cents. Smaller makers cannot cope. Qimonda, for instance, piled up losses of about euro1.5 billion between October 2007 and June 2008. Its revenues were only euro1.3 billion.

不必惊讶，有时供给远大于需求。从2002年到去年，尤其是亚洲内存芯片制造商，好似不要钱般的投资，这也解释了为什么现今每个人都大赔特赔。2007年 7月512MB的DRAM（动态随机存取存储器）芯片的价格超过两美元，今年4月早些降至50美分。小型制造厂商无法应对，例如奇梦达，它在2007年 10月到2008年7月之间累积了15亿欧元的亏损，而他的收入仅为13亿欧元。

Given the scale of the losses and the screaming from other industries, governments look less inclined to help this time. Even Taiwan is having second thoughts about an ambitious plan to save its memory-chip industry, announced only last month. The idea is to merge and bail out the country’s six makers of memory chips, which have lost $12.5 billion in the past two years and accumulated $11 billion in debts.

尽管看到亏损的规模和其他行业的呼吁，政府似乎并不倾向于此时出手。即使台湾也正考虑改变上月刚公布的关于解救内存芯片产业的庞大计划。那个计划是合并本土的六家内存芯片制造商以摆脱困境。这些制造商在过去的两年里亏损了125亿美元并积累了110亿美元的债务。

Even if Taiwan were to let these firms fail, which is highly unlikely, supply would still exceed demand, according to iSuppli. Global sales of memory chips will not start growing again before next year. And growth will not reattain its 2006 rate before 2015.

来自iSuppli的数据指出，这些企业关闭是不太可能的；但即使台湾关闭这些企业，供给仍然大于需求。全球内存芯片销售在明年之前不会开始增长，此外，增长速率在2015年之前不会重新达到2006年水平。

Whatever happens to Qimonda and its Taiwanese rivals, the current crisis is sure to speed up two seemingly contradictory long-term trends in the industry. It is consolidating, in that the manufacture of chips is becoming concentrated among fewer companies. At the same time, it is splitting up, in that more companies are specialising in design, and contracting out or quitting the making of chips. Both developments are mainly the consequence of what has come to be called “Moore’s Second Law”, an economic counterpart to a better known observation by Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel, the world’s biggest chipmaker by revenue.

无论在奇梦达和它的台湾对手身上发生了什么，当前的危机必然会加速该行业这两个看似矛盾的长期趋势。趋势之一是半导体行业的整合—芯片制造集中到少数的企业。同时，另一个趋势是行业的分化，更多企业专注于设计，外包或退出芯片制造业务。这两种趋势主要都是人们所说的“摩尔第二定律”的结果，该定律是戈登 •摩尔提出的另一更著名论断在经济学上的应用。这是Intel的创始人之一戈登•摩尔[3]（Gordon Moore）提出的一个著名经济学论断，就收入而言，Intel是世界上最大的芯片制造商。（这里说的另一更著名的论断便是“摩尔定律”——在价格恒定的情况下，集成电路上可容纳的晶体管数目，约每隔18个月便会增加一倍，性能也将提升一倍；或者说，每一美元所能买到的电脑性能，将每隔18个月翻两倍以上。）

The original Moore’s Law is usually summarised thus: the number of transistors on a chip doubles every 18 months. In fact Mr Moore first predicted this would happen every year and later changed his forecast to every two years; the average has become his law. Mr Hutcheson points out that Mr Moore made more than a purely technical prediction. He also stated that the cost of an integrated circuit would stay the same, a halving of the cost per transistor with every doubling of the number.

原始摩尔定律经常被表述为：单块硅芯片上所集成的晶体管数目每十八个月增加1倍。事实上，摩尔先生最初的的预测为每一年，后来改为每两年；他的这条定律取 其平均数。Hutcheson先生指出摩尔先生做的不仅仅是纯粹的技术预测。他接着指出由于每个晶体管的成本减半和能集成的晶体管数量翻一番，集成电路的 成本将保持不变。

This has turned out to be essentially correct, but progress has come at a high price. The ever more sophisticated equipment required to make semiconductors has been getting dearer with every iteration of Moore’s Law. The most advanced chips are built using 32-nanometre technology, meaning that transistors are now so tiny that more than 4m can fit on this full stop. Lithographic tools for transferring Lilliputian circuitry onto a wafer cost up to $50m a pop. To reach the economies of scale needed to make such investments pay, chipmakers must build bigger fabs.

摩尔定律已经被事实证明是十分正确的，但进展是在高昂代价下的。随着摩尔定律的每个反复，用来制造半导体的越来越尖端的设备已变的更为昂贵。最先进的芯片 使用32纳米技术制造，这意味着晶体管是如此微小，以致于超过4百万个才抵得上这个句点。流行的用来移动微小电路到晶圆上的印刷工具价值5千万美元。为了 达到规模经济以抵消大量的前期投入，芯片制造商必须建造更大的晶圆厂。

Rising fixed costs give rise to Moore’s Second Law: as the cost of transistors comes down, the cost of fabs goes up, albeit not at quite the same rate. In 1966 a new fab cost $14m. By 1995 the price had risen to $1.5 billion. Today, says Intel, the cost of a leading-edge fab exceeds $6 billion, including all the preparatory work. And the Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has built two “GigaFabs” for between $8 billion and $10 billion each, which would buy you four nuclear power stations. The output of such monsters depends on the mix of products, but they each could easily churn out 3 billion chips a year.

固定成本上升引起摩尔第二定律：尽管不是完全相同的速率，随着晶体管成本下降，晶圆成本上升。在1966年，建设一个新晶圆厂的花费为1400万美元，到 了1955年花费上升到15亿美元。今日，就Intel而言，其先进晶圆厂的建设花费超过60亿美元，其中包括所有准备工作。并且，台积电（TSMC）已 经兴建了两个“十亿级晶圆厂”，每个的造价都在80亿到100亿美元之间，这些钱足够买四座核电站。这些怪物般的产出有赖于产品的混合，但他们中的每一个都能一年轻松产出30亿芯片。

These ever-increasing costs and the need for specialisation have caused the industry to splinter, says Derek Lidow, iSuppli’s chief executive. Originally, all chipmakers were vertically integrated, meaning they designed the chip, built the tools to make them, ran the fabs and added the necessary connectors. As costs went up and certain activities became more and more complex, they were spun out to spread expenses and know-how. Semiconductor equipment, design software and packaging have long been done by separate companies. But the past ten years have seen the rise of “fabless” firms, which merely design integrated circuits.

iSuppli总裁Derek Lidow指出，这些成本的不断增加和对专业化的需求已经导致整个行业开始分化。最初，所有的芯片制造者呈纵向一体化，意味着他们自己设计芯片，制造制作 工具，建设晶圆厂以及添加必要的中间环节。随着成本的增加和相关活动的复杂化，他们开始分化以分摊开支和工艺流程。半导体设备、设计软件程序包已长期分别由单独的公司来完成。过去的十年里已经出现了许多“无生产线”公司，他们仅仅设计集成电路。

Now established chipmakers can no longer afford to develop their own manufacturing processes or even to run their own fabs. To share the pain, IBM, Samsung and others have teamed up to use chipmaking technology jointly. Some firms, such as Texas Instruments, have chosen to go “fab-lite”, meaning that they have their own fabs only for certain chips. Others, such as AMD, have spun off manufacturing completely (although AMD’s decision had much to do with a lack of cash after it bought ATI, a maker of graphics chips, for $5.4 billion in 2006).

现在已建立的芯片制造商再也不能发展自己的生产工艺或者运行他们自己的晶圆厂。为了分担痛楚，IBM、三星和其它公司已经联合起来共同使用芯片制造技术。 一些公司，例如德州仪器（Texas Instruments），已经选择走“轻晶圆厂”道路，也就是说，他们有自己的只生产特定芯片的晶圆厂。其它的，例如AMD，它已经把制造完全的分割了 出去（虽然AMD的决定在很大程度上是因为在2006年以54亿美元的价格收购了图形芯片制造商ATI后缺乏资金）。

Hence the rise of “foundries”, the smelters of the information age. These are essentially contract manufacturers. Although far from household names, they are huge companies, churning out about one quarter of the world’s semiconductors. The biggest, TSMC, has a manufacturing capacity greater even than Intel’s. Its revenues grew at an annual average rate of 13% for several years, topping $10.6 billion, before falling by almost a third in the last quarter of 2008.

因此晶圆代工厂的增加是信息时代的熔炉。这些代工厂基本上属于合同制造商。虽然远非家喻户晓，但他们 都是巨型企业，以致制造全世界半导体的四分之一。其中最大的—台积电，它的制造能力甚至超过Intel。它的年收入以13%的年增长率增长，在2008最 后季度几乎三分之一的下降之前，曾达到过106亿美元的高点。

TSMC also illustrates a corollary of Moore’s Second Law: even the biggest chipmakers must keep expanding. Intel today accounts for 82% of global microprocessor revenue and has annual revenues of $37.6 billion because it understood this long ago. In the early 1980s, when Intel was a $700m company—pretty big for the time—Andy Grove, once Intel’s boss, notorious for his paranoia, was not satisfied. “He would run around and tell everybody that we have to get to $1 billion,” recalls Andy Bryant, the firm’s chief administrative officer. “He knew that you had to have a certain size to stay in business.”

台积电还表明了摩尔第二定律的必然结果：即使最大的芯片制造商也必须保持扩张。Intel之所以现今占据全球微处理器销售收 入的82%，年收入达到376亿美元，就是因为它早已懂得了这个道理。早在20世纪80年代，Intel的市值为7亿美元，这在当时已相当庞大了。而当时 的因偏执而声名狼藉的老总Andy Grove并不满意。“他总是东奔西跑并告诉每一个人我们应当达到10亿美元，” 该公司的首席行政长官Andy Bryant回忆道。“他知道，你必须有一定的规模来维持生意。”

Japanese banks

A capital affair 日本银行的资本事件

Apr 8th 2009 | TOKYO
From The Economist print edition

The investments of Japanese banks in other firms create a vicious circle

日本银行投资于其它公司成了一个怪圈。

IN A country where social relations are paramount, Japanese banks are so loyal to their customers that they hold shares in them. That loyalty has been tested for almost 20 years whenever the stockmarket lurches lower. But still the banks cling on to their shares, carrying around ￥10 trillion-worth ($100 billion) on their books.

日本是一个社交至上的国家，日本银行如此忠心于其客户，以至持有他们的股权。这份忠诚已经历了20多年来股市每每受挫时的考验。而银行依然保持参股姿态，在其收支平衡表上大约值10万亿日圆（1000万美元）。

The trouble is, the further the market falls, the more banks have to write down the asset values on their balance-sheets, which increases their losses. It also shrinks the tier-one capital that they hold as a cushion against further losses, constraining their ability to lend.

麻烦的是，市场越下滑，银行资产负债表上资产的价值就越缩水，为此损失越多。一级资本亦会缩减，一级资本被用作对付进一步亏损的缓冲，同时放贷能力受限。

The country’s three “megabanks”—Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Mizuho and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG)—are particularly vulnerable. Their shareholdings as a percentage of tier-one capital range from just below 50% to above 60% (see chart). The trio are expected to post losses this year.

日本三大“超级银行”——三菱日联金融集团（Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group）、瑞穗金融集团（Mizuho Financial Group）和三井住友金融集团（Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group）——尤为岌岌可危。他们所持股权占一级资本的百分比由50%以下变动至60%以上（见表）。预计三大行今年将亏损。

But in Japan, even the titans find it hard to break with tradition, especially one that dates back to the Meiji era in the late 1800s when Japan began to industrialise. Capital was scarce and banks felt they had a role to support national industry; taking a stake in a borrower showed that their fates were united. Moreover, most banks were linked to companies within corporate families, called zaibatsu. That smoothed trade within and outside the groups.

但在日本，即使是伟人也难于打破传统，尤其是在19世纪末日本开始工业化的明治时代。资本匮乏，且银行认为它们有责任支撑本国的工业；参股借贷企业表示他们一损俱损，一荣俱荣。此外，大多数银行都与家族集团联系在一起，称之为财阀。这样做使集团内外的交易顺利进行。

After the second world war, huge conglomerates were forbidden and replaced by the keiretsu, a network of individual companies working together. Cross-shareholdings remained routine.

二战后，大型企业集团被禁，转而由企业联盟替代，这是一个私营公司合作网。交叉持股依然是惯例。

For most of the postwar period, the arrangement was highly lucrative. As share prices soared, balance-sheets swelled. This in turn pushed share prices higher. But after the bubble burst in 1990, it took a decade for regulators to begin forcing banks to reduce their shareholdings. In 2002 the government capped the ratio of equities to tier-one capital at 100%, which marked the beginning of the reduction (with the state itself as a buyer). Now, as then, requiring banks to dump their shareholdings altogether—however laudable—would run the risk of turning a bear market into a rout.

战后的大多时间里，此举带来了高额利润。随着股价高涨，资产负债表跟着膨胀。这转而推动股价进一步走高。但在1990年股市泡沫破灭后，日本监管层耗时十 年开始强制银行减少其所持股权。2002年日本政府规定了所持股本最高上限，即为一级资本数额，此举标志着缩减股权的开始（国家作为买主）。目前同那时一 样，要求银行抛售他们手中的股权——虽值得赞誉——却存在着使本就颓废的市场垮掉的风险。

Although today shareholdings remain huge compared with bank capital, the ratio is a third of the 150% of a decade ago. And although Japanese banks own 5% of the value of the country’s stockmarket, this too is far below the 20% they owned in 1985. So however troubling the problems remain, the banks can at least point to improvement.

虽然当前所持股权相较于银行资本而言依然是庞大的，但比率却是十年前的三分之一，当时比率为（一级资本的）150%。而且尽管日本银行占有该国股市市值的5%，但这相较于其1985年所占20%的比例真是小巫见大巫。因此虽然麻烦问题仍在，银行却至少能励精图治。

Japanese banks must deduct a percentage of certain unrealised losses from their shareholdings from their tier-one capital. According to UBS, every 10% drop in the Nikkei 225 Stock Average requires banks to raise from ￥13 billion to ￥190 billion apiece to replenish their tier-one ratios to around 7.5%. That would still be below 8%, the level considered safe in the current climate.

日本银行必须要从其所持股权和一级资本中扣除一定比例的未变现亏损。据瑞银集团（UBS），日经225指数每下滑10%，银行就需要增加130亿至1900亿日圆补充其一级资本，使其比率维持在7.5%左右。该比率仍低于当前环境下8%的安全度。

Raising funds is painful. In February Mizuho said it would issue ￥80 billion in preferred securities to rebuild its capital, but pay an annual fixed coupon of almost 15%—a cost it almost certainly cannot cover from its earnings. More recently it declined to redeem a $1.5 billion security at the first possible date, underscoring its need to preserve capital.

增加资本金着实困难。瑞穗金融集团在2月份表示，该集团将发行800亿日圆的优先债券修复其资本，但所支付的固定票息超过15%，收益几乎不够支付成本。最近该集团拒绝在最初的可能到期日赎回价值150亿美元的债券，强调其需要保有资本。

In recent weeks, the government has offered to inject capital into the banks and has set aside ￥20 trillion to buy many of the wilting shares from them. That would enable the banks to strengthen their balance-sheets further, preserve capital and keep on lending. But most banks have resisted: relying on the state would suggest they are in trouble. And selling would require them to crystallise the losses rather than let hope—that one day the stockmarket may miraculously recover—spring eternal. In the season of cherry blossoms, hope is all they have.

近几周来，日本政府已提出向银行业注资，并留有20万亿日圆购买银行手中持有的许多贬 值股票。此举可使银行资本负债表进一步充盈、保有资本及继续放贷。但多数银行却拒绝了，认为依赖政府会表明他们陷于困境。而出售手中的股权将要求他们具体 化其亏损度，而非使希望——某天股市会奇迹般反弹——永存。在这个樱花盛开的季节，他们所拥有的只有希望而已。